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Abstract
My dissertation consists of two chapters where I study the role of financial frictions and openness
to trade on several macroeconomic variables such as gross domestic product or total factor
productivity.
In the first chapter, I study the effects that trade and multinational production barriers have
on countries of different size. The gains from openness to trade and multinational production
(MP) depend largely on country size. A large country may attract more foreign firms by closing
itself to trade, while a small country may attract a larger amount of MP if trade costs with its
neighbors are low because it can be used as an export platform. I develop a model to study
these effects, where firms face non-convex decisions of whether to serve a foreign country by
exporting from the home country, exporting from a third country, or producing in the foreign
country. I calibrate the model separately for South America and Europe. I find that the gains
from openness in Europe double those in South America, and that the distribution of these gains
varies less with size in South America. I also find that MP is more important in explaining the
gains from openness in large countries, but the export platform mechanism is more important
in small countries. Finally, I find that trade and MP have important implications for the size
distribution of firms.
In the second chapter, which is joint with Andre´s Erosa, we study the effects of financial fric-
tions on occupational choice decisions and on economic inequality. To address this question,
we develop a quantitative theory of entrepreneurship, income inequality, and financial frictions
disciplined with household data from Brazil. Our theory extends Lucas (1978) by modeling
heterogeneity in two skills: −working and managerial skills. Consistently with the evidence,
the theory implies three occupational categories: workers, employers, and self-employed en-
trepreneurs. We find that the removal of financial frictions decreases self-employment rates from
24% to 11% (with small effects on the number of employers), increases aggregate output by
48%, and has non-trivial effects on the distribution of income. We also find that while most
households benefit from a reform that eliminates enforcement problems, the majority of em-
ployers (about two thirds) lose from the reform. By depressing the demand for labor, limited
enforcement depresses the equilibrium wage rate, increasing the profits of employers. Our theory
thus suggests that employers in Brazil may have a vested interested in maintaining a status quo
with low enforcement.
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Resumen
Mi tesis doctoral consiste de dos cap´ıtulos en donde estudio los efectos que tienen la fricciones
financieras y el comercio internacional sobre diferentes variables macroecono´micas, tales como
el producto bruto interno o la productividad total de los factores.
En el primer cap´ıtulo, estudio los efectos que tienen las barreras al comercio y a la produccio´n
multinacional en pa´ıses de distintos taman˜os. Las ganancias de abrirse al comercio internacional
y a la produccio´n multinacional dependen del taman˜o de un pa´ıs. Un pa´ıs grande puede atraer
ma´s firmas extranjeras cerra´ndose al comercio internacional, mientras que un pa´ıs pequen˜o
puede atraer una mayor cantidad de firmas extranjeras bajando los costes de comerciar con
pa´ıses vecinos al poder ser utilizado como una plataforma de exportacio´n. Para estudiar estos
mecanismos, construyo un modelo donde las firmas enfrentan costes no convexos de vender
sus bienes mediante exportaciones, instalando una planta en el pa´ıs de destino, o exportando
desde un tercer pa´ıs. Calibro el modelo de forma separada para Ame´rica del Sur y Europa.
El primer resultado es que las ganancias que los pa´ıses de Europa obtienen de su actual nivel
de apertura duplican las ganancias que obtienen los pa´ıses de Sudame´rica, y a su vez estas
ganancias var´ıan mas con el taman˜o del pa´ıs que en el caso de Sudame´rica. Tambie´n encuentro
que la produccio´n multinacional es ma´s importante para explicar las ganancias de apertura en
los pa´ıses grandes que en los pa´ıses pequen˜os, pero el mecanismo de actuar como plataforma de
exportacio´n tiene un rol ma´s importante en los pa´ıses pequen˜os. Finalmente, encuentro que tanto
el comercio internacional como la produccio´n multinacional tienen implicaciones importantes en
la distribucio´n del taman˜o de las firmas.
En el segundo cap´ıtulo, co-autoreado con Andre´s Erosa, estudiamos los efectos de las fricciones
financieras en las decisiones ocupacionales y en la desigualdad. A fin de analizar este tema,
desarrollamos una teor´ıa cuantitativa de emprendedurismo, desigualdad del ingreso y fricciones
financieras, disciplinada con datos de Brasil. Nuestra teor´ıa extiende el modelo presentado en
Lucas (1978), modelando heterogeneidad en dos habilidades: habilidad como trabajador y habil-
idad como manager. Consistente con la evidencia, la teor´ıa implica tres categorias ocupacionales:
trabajadores, cuentapropistas y empleadores. Encontramos que el remover las fricciones fi-
nancieras disminuye la proporcio´n de cuentapropistas de 24% a 11% (con cambios pequen˜os en
el nu´mero de empleadores), incrementa el producto en un 48%, y tiene efectos no triviales en la
distribucio´n del ingreso. Tambie´n encontramos que mientras la mayor´ıa de las familias se benefi-
cia de la reforma que elimina las fricciones financieras, la mayor´ıa de los empleadores (alrededor
de dos tercios) pierde con esta reforma. Disminuyendo la demanda de trabajo, las fricciones
financieras disminuyen el salario de equilibrio e incrementan el beneficio de los empleadores.
Nuestra teor´ıa sugiere que los empleadores en Brasil pueden tener intere´s en mantener el status
quo con fricciones financieras.
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Chapter 1
Asymmetric Effects of Trade and
FDI: South America versus Europe
1.1 Introduction
The gains from openness to trade and multinational production (MP) depend largely on country
size. A large country may attract more foreign firms by closing itself to trade, while a small
country may attract a larger amount of MP if trade costs with its neighbors are low because it
can be used as an export platform. I develop a quantitative theory to assess how trade barriers
and country size interact to determine the location of multinational firms, and its effects on
GDP, GNP, and firm size distribution.
Trade barriers affect the location decision of multinational firms in two ways. First, trade barriers
change the relative cost of exporting compared to producing in the consumption location. A
firm may decide to become multinational if it is cheaper to serve a market by MP rather than
by exporting. Second, trade barriers change the relative cost of exporting from two different
locations. Firms may use a country as an export platform to serve a set of neighbor countries.1
The importance of these two channels depends critically on country size. For a small country
it is difficult to attract multinational production to overcome trade barriers since its domestic
market is small. Then, for a small country the way of attracting multinational firms is by offering
the possibility of serving other countries, i.e. to be used as an export platform. On the other
hand, large countries, as they have large markets, can attract MP even with high trade costs
(they may attract even a larger amount of MP with trade barriers than without).
I quantitatively compare the performance of large and small countries in two different regions:
South America, with high trade barriers; and Europe, with low trade barriers. In order to
1I call this mechanism bridge multinational production following Ramondo and Rodr´ıguez-Clare (2013).
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do so, I use a heterogeneous firm model of trade with monopolistic competition, asymmetric
countries, and allowing for MP and bridge multinational production (BMP). I perform two
separate calibrations, one for each region. In the calibration for South America, I include
Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay. In the calibration for Europe, I include four members of
the European Union (France, Italy, Netherlands and United Kingdom). In both cases I include
a fifth country which stands for the rest of the world. To calibrate the model I use data on
bilateral trade flows, bilateral FDI flows, firm composition (domestic and foreign, exporters and
non-exporters), GDP per capita, manufacturing trade deficit, and labor force size.
To assess the gains from openness I compare the real GDP in the calibrated model economies
with the real GDP in autarky. I find that the gains from openness in Europe double those in
South America (10.5% versus 5.3% of real GDP), indicating that, as a region, South America is
closed, benefitting little from trade and MP. Then, I perform three experiments to disentangle
the contribution of the different channels through which MP affects the gains from openness: (i)
by producing and selling in the domestic country (MP itself); (ii) by using the domestic country
as an export platform (BMP); and (iii) both effects together. To asses the contribution of MP
itself (without considering the BMP channel), I compare the losses of going to autarky in a
world with MP and no BMP versus a world without MP (this implies no BMP neither). I find
that MP itself plays a bigger role in large countries. In the Netherlands the losses of going to
autarky in a world without BMP are 20% larger than in a world without MP, while in Italy are
84% larger. This means that for the Netherlands most of the gains from MP come from BMP
while in Italy most of the gains come from MP itself (not from BMP). To assess the role played
by BMP, in the second experiment I compare the losses of going to autarky in the calibrated
model economies with the losses in a world in which BMP is not allowed. I find that BMP
is more important for small countries. For example, in the Netherlands the losses of going to
autarky are 20% higher in the baseline economy than in the world without BMP, while in Italy
are only 10% higher. Finally, to assess the contribution of MP (including both mechanisms),
I compare the losses of going to autarky in the calibrated model economies with the losses of
going to autarky in a world without MP. I find that MP as a whole is more important for large
countries. The losses of going to autarky Italy are 100% larger than in a world without MP,
while in the Netherlands are only 44% larger. It is worth mentioning that in South America,
since economies are more closed (reducing the possibility of exploiting BMP) and foreign firms
are much less efficient (reducing the gains from MP itself)2, the role played by MP and BMP
in explaining the gains from openness in large and small countries is changed. Uruguay (the
small country) benefits more from BMP than Brazil, but MP itself is equally important in both
countries.
2Even though I do not explicitly model this aspect, the low efficiency of multinationals (high γ in the model)
may be due to institutions, labor market policies, input quality, etc.
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My second set of finding is that the differences between what a small and what a big country
lose when going to autarky are very different among regions. In South America, losses are more
homogeneously distributed (vary less with size) than in Europe. The difference between what
Brazil (the largest country) loses in real manufacturing GDP and what Uruguay (the smallest
country) loses is of 8.5 percentage points, while in Europe this difference is of 14.7 percentage
points. The higher heterogeneity in Europe comes from the fact that Europe is more opened
than South America which allows a small country in Europe, like the Netherlands, to take more
advantage from trade and MP than a small country in South America, like Uruguay.
Next, I study what would be the gains in South America of improving the degree of openness.
South America is a much more closed region and there could be large gains from openness. To do
this, I decrease the variable trade cost in all countries in the calibration for South America setting
them to the average level in Europe.3 I find that all countries benefit from this reduction, but the
smallest country, Uruguay, is the one who benefits the most with an increase in manufacturing
real GDP of 30%. If, in addition, the efficiency of multinational firms operating in these countries
increases 20%, the gains would increase from 30% to 50%. The gains for Uruguay would be even
larger if the improvement in efficiency takes place only in Uruguay but not in the rest of countries.
This is because in this case Uruguay would face less competition to attract multinational firms.
However BMP is crucial to attain the gains from better efficiency. If I do not allow for BMP,
the additional gains Uruguay would get by improving efficiency (on top of the ones obtained by
reducing trade costs) are close to zero.
Finally, I study how openness affects the size distribution of businesses across countries and
regions. In the calibrated model economies, the size distribution of firms changes across countries
of different size in the same region, and also across countries of the same size in different region.
I find that openness increases the proportion of large firms (with more than 250 employees)
more in small than in large countries, and also that this effect is larger in the open than in the
closed region. In the baseline economy, the Netherlands has 4.2% of large firms while Uruguay
has 1.1%, Italy has 1.7% and Brazil has 0.8%. Therefore, internationalization of firms has an
important effect on the size distribution of firms. This is, I believe, an important contribution
to the misallocation literature on business size distribution. Previous papers have studied the
effects of size dependent policies (Guner, Ventura, and Xu (2008), Restuccia and Rogerson
(2008), Garc´ıa-Santana and Pijoan-Mas (2012)), capital market imperfections (Erosa (2001),
Amaral and Quintin (2010), Buera, Kaboski, and Shin (2011), Greenwood, Sanchez, and Wang
(2010)) and trade (Melitz (2003), Piguillem and Rubini (2012)) on firm size distribution. My
paper contributes to this literature by addressing the effect that trade and MP have on the size
of businesses.
3I understand that in the trade barriers I use in the model, I include features like geography or language which
vary a lot between regions and are probably not subject to reductions. Still using Europe as the best scenario
that South America can reach is a very informative exercise on the size of the gains that could be obtained.
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Previous studies have analyzed the interaction of trade and MP but these studies did not allow for
BMP.4 Recently, three papers model BMP. Ramondo and Rodr´ıguez-Clare (2013) use a ricardian
model of trade to address the gains from openness (trade and MP). However, they cannot
address the effects of country size on the location of multinational firms since they assume perfect
competition and as a result they do not model fixed costs of MP. Arkolakis, Ramondo, Rodriguez-
Clare, and Yeaple (2013) model trade and MP with monopolistic competition. However, they
do not include fixed costs of setting up foreign firms. Fixed costs are important to study the
role that the size of a country plays in determining the location of multinationals which is the
goal of my paper. With fixed costs there are increasing returns in production, which makes the
size of a market an important variable to make a location decision. The closest paper to mine
is Tintelnot (2012). He includes fixed cost of producing and performing MP and studies the
gains from openness (trade and MP) in a monopolistic competition set-up. The focus in my
theory is on how BMP shapes the impact of country size and geography (the distribution of
trade costs across different countries) on the determination of output and trade across countries.
In particular, I use my theory to quantitatively assess and compare the geography of trade and
multinational production barriers in South America versus Europe. Finally, I also assess the
effects of trade, MP and BMP on the distribution of firm sizes.
1.2 Facts
I now document some facts on the relation between trade, FDI and size for South America
and Europe.5 It is a well known fact in the trade literature that small countries benefit the
most from trade. As a result it is expected to observe that small countries are more open than
large countries. Figure 1.1 presents the relation between trade and size for South America (blue
circles) and Europe (orange squares).6,7 First, note that the points for Europe are above those
for South America which indicates that for countries of similar sizes, trade-to-GDP ratio is larger
in Europe than in South America. Then European countries are more open and benefit more
from trade. Also the fitted line is steeper in Europe than in South America (the slopes are -0.51
for Europe and -0.28 for South America) which indicates that trade-to-GDP varies more with
size in Europe than in South America. Then European countries are more open than South
American countries, and the difference increases with country size, suggesting that the extent
to which small countries benefit from trade in South America relative to Europe is much lower
than that for large countries.
4See Helpman (1984), Horstmann and Markusen (1992), Markusen and Venables (2000), Helpman, Melitz, and
Yeaple (2004), Irarrazabal, Moxnes, and Opromolla (2013)
5The data is from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Statistics for the
year 2012.
6Trade is measured as trade in merchandising over GDP and size as the natural logarithm of population.
7I exclude Cyprus and Luxembourg from the European Union sample.
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Figure 1.2 presents the relation between FDI and size for the same group of countries.8 In
this case we observe that for Europe there is a negative relation between FDI and size: small
countries have larger ratios of FDI/GDP . However, this relation is flat in South America (the
slopes of the fitted line are -0.30 for Europe and -0.02 for South America). Then, the extent to
which small countries benefit from FDI in South America relative to Europe is lower than that
for large countries.
To sum up, South American countries show lower trade-to-GDP ratios than European countries.
Also, the relation between trade and size is less steep in South America than in Europe, increasing
the differences in the trade-to-GDP ratios between the two regions for small countries. As trade
is key in small countries to attract foreign firms (to be used as an export platform) we expect
small South American countries to not be able to attract as much FDI as small European
countries. This is confirm in Figure 1.2 where the relation between FDI and size is negative
in Europe but it is flat for South America. The lower trade-to-GDP and FDI-to-GDP ratios
in South America, indicates that the region as a whole is more closed than Europe with small
countries benefiting less from the potential gains from openness. In what follows I develop a
model of trade and multinational production to measure trade and MP barriers that countries
are facing and assessing the potential gains from openness that South American countries may
obtain.
1.3 Model
The model builds on Melitz (2003) but adds the possibility of multinational production and
bridge multinational production. There is a set of countries with different sizes. In each country
there is a representative consumer. In the world economy there are two types of goods: a
homogeneous good and a differentiated good, both of them tradable. Each differentiated good is
produced by a firm with a given productivity. Differentiated goods have three sub-indices: the
first one indicates where the good is consumed, the second one where the good is produced and
the last one to which country the firm that produced the good belongs. For example, qijk(ω) is
the quantity of good ω consumed in country i and produced in country j by a firm from country
k.
1.3.1 Countries
The world economy consists of i = 1, ..., N countries; two sectors: a homogeneous-good sector
(sector 0) and a differentiated good sector (sector 1); one factor of production, labor; and a
continuum of goods indexed by ω ∈ Ω. All goods in the economy are tradable. Each country
8FDI is measured as the stock of FDI in a country as a proportion of GDP.
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has a population of Li individuals who supply labor inelastically. Let wi be the wage in country
i in terms of the homogeneous good. I set the price of the homogeneous good, P0, to be the
numeraire. In each country there is a large mass of potential firms producing.
1.3.2 Consumers
In each country there is a representative consumer with Cobb-Douglas preferences:
Ui = q
µ0
i,0q
(1−µ0)
i,1 , (1.1)
where µ0 is the share of the homogeneous good in total consumption and q1 is a Dixit-Stiglitz
aggregator9 :
qi,1 =
￿￿
qi(ω)
(σ−1)
σ dω
￿ σ
σ−1
,
where σ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between varieties and qi,1 are all the varieties con-
sumed in country i.
The above utility function implies that the representative consumer will spend µ0 share of his
income on the homogeneous good and 1−µ0 in differentiated goods. Then the demand functions
are:
qi0 =
µ0Ei
P 0i
,
qi1 =
(1− µ0)Ei
P 0i
, (1.2)
where P 0i is the aggregate price index in country i including the homogeneous good sector and
Ei is the aggregate expenditure in country i.
Define the expenditure in the differentiated good sector as (1− µ0) ∗ E = E1, where E is total
expenditure. Then, the demand for variety ω is given by:
qjki(ω) =
E1j
Pj
￿
pjki(ω)
Pj
￿−σ
, (1.3)
where E1j is the aggregate expenditure of country j in differentiated goods and Pj is the aggregate
price in the differentiated good sector in country j.10 The demand of good qjki(ω) is increasing
in total expenditure and the aggregate price of the country where the good is consumed (E1j
and Pj), and decreasing in the price of the good.
9Where ρ = σ−1σ . I will use σ or ρ in my definitions depending on convenience.
10I will give a formula for Pj later since I still need to define some concepts used in the definition of Pj .
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1.3.3 Homogeneous good
Each country has an exogenous endowment zi of the homogeneous good. This good is traded
without any cost. This implies that the price of this good will be equalized among countries.
We will denote the price of the homogeneous good as p0. Each country will be an exporter or
importer of this good depending on whether the domestic supply of the good is bigger or smaller
than the domestic demand of the good.
Without the homogenous good, the model would require trade imbalances to be compensated
by capital account imbalances to get a balanced current account. This would imply that a
country having trade deficit would have capital account surplus. Capital account surplus in
this model means that profits from domestic firms producing abroad are larger than profits from
foreign firms producing in the domestic country. Introducing the homogenous good sector allows
the model to have countries with both trade deficit in the differentiated good and also capital
account deficits, something that is present in the Latin-American countries I am considering.
1.3.4 Differentiated good sector
1.3.4.1 Production
To produce the differentiated good the only input used is labor.11, 12 Firms pay a fixed entry cost
κei to make the labor productivity draw φ, denominated in labor units (then what a firm pays
is wi ∗ κei ). I assume that productivities are drawn from a Pareto distribution. After observing
the productivity, firms decide whether to produce or not.
Firms have to pay a fixed cost of operation κdi , also denominated in labor units, to produce
domestically. There are other activities that the firms can choose to perform: to export, to
produce in a foreign country to sell there, or to produce in a foreign country and export from
there.
To export firms have to pay a fixed cost (independent of the selling destination) and an iceberg
type cost which is partner specific. Firms producing in country i and exporting to country j
pay a fixed cost wi ∗ κxi and an iceberg cost τji per unit sold i.e. they have to send τji ≥ 1 units
of the good for one unit to arrive destiny.
11As a result, this paper analyzes horizontal FDI in the spirit of Markusen (1995). See Barba Navaretti and
Venables (2004) for a review of the literature on FDI (both vertical and horizontal FDI).
12The work of Irarrazabal, Moxnes, and Opromolla (2013) model trade with vertical FDI. When assuming that
foreign firms use imported intermediate goods as input, we are introducing complementarity between trade and
MP. With horizontal FDI and allowing for BMP, MP and trade can be substitutes or complements. Ramondo
and Rodr´ıguez-Clare (2013) on the other hand model both vertical and horizontal FDI.
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When a firm produces abroad its productivity is shifted by a parameter γ. The new productivity
of firm from country i producing in country j is φˆ = φγji . In addition, a firm from country i
producing in country j has to pay a fixed cost wj ∗ κMPj which is independent from the source
country (all foreign firms producing in country j pay the same fixed cost). κMPj includes the
domestic cost of producing in country j and an extra cost i.e. κMPj ≥ κdj .
I will now define the costs and profits for firms performing each activity.
A firm from country i producing qjki units in country k and selling to country j has the following
variable cost:
cjki(ω) =
τjkγkiwk
φ
qjki(ω) .
If j = k then τjk = 1, and if k = i then γki = 1. Notice that a firm from country i producing
in country k and selling to country j, with i ￿= k and j ￿= k, has to pay both costs γki and τjk.
Maximizing variable profits of a firm from country i for a given activity,
max
p(ω)
π = p(ω)q(ω)− c(ω) , (1.4)
where q(ω) was defined in equation (1.3), we get the price of a variety, given by:
pjki(ω) =
wkγkiτjk
ρφ
. (1.5)
As each firm produces a different variety we can substitute, without loss of generality, ω by φ.
Using expression (1.3) and (1.5) we obtain the revenue associated with each activity.
Selling Domestically⇒ riii(φ) = E1i P σ−1i
￿
ρφ
wi
￿σ−1
Exporting from the home country⇒ rkii(φ) = E1kP σ−1k
￿
ρφ
wiτki
￿σ−1
(1.6)
Doing MP in country k ⇒ rkki(φ) = E1kP σ−1k
￿
ρφ
wkγki
￿σ−1
Doing BMP in k to sell in j ⇒ rjki(φ) = E1jP σ−1j
￿
ρφ
wkγkiτjk
￿σ−1
The next step is to find what firms are going to perform each activity. A firm will perform an
activity as long as the activity is profitable. Let start with firms only selling domestically. A
firm will sell domestically if
πiii(φ) =
E1i P
σ−1
i
σ
￿
ρφ
wi
￿σ−1
− κdiwi ≥ 0 (1.7)
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As profits are increasing with productivities, there will be one productivity (the cut-off produc-
tivity) for which profits will be equal to zero. I will denote the domestic productivity cut-off
as φ∗iii. All firms with productivities higher than φ∗iii will sell domestically. Now, firms can also
export or produce abroad. Before continuing, let me assume the following:
Assumption 1: A variety is defined by the country of origin of the firm and the country where
the good is produced.
Assumption 2: Any firm from country i performing an activity has to pay the domestic cost
of producing in i.
With assumption 1 a firm from Uruguay producing in Uruguay and exporting to Brazil is going to
sell a different variety than the same firm producing in Brazil and selling in Brazil. The fact that
varieties are determined also by the production location simplifies the solution of the problem
allowing me to treat each activity as independent activities.13,14 In the absence of assumption 1 a
firm from Uruguay will have to choose how to serve the Brazilian market (either by producing in
Uruguay and exporting, by doing MP in Brazil or by doing MP in a third country and exporting
to Brazil) since the variety sold is the same independently from the production location. Then,
without assumption 1 there will be more competition between countries for attracting MP,
which would increase the importance of the efficiency of multinationals operating in the domestic
country (parameter γ). Also, without assumption 1 BMP becomes a more important factor for
attracting MP. In the quantitative section I discuss in more details the role of assumption 1.
Assumption 2 ensures that there will be no firms exporting or doing MP and not selling in the
domestic country.
The profit for a firm from country i exporting to country k is given by:
πkii(φ) =
E1kP
σ−1
k
σ
￿
ρφ
wiτki
￿σ−1
− κxi wi (1.8)
Setting this equation equal to zero, we can find the cut-off productivity (φ∗kii) for a firm from
country i exporting to country k. To fix ideas, let us keep aside the possibility of MP. Then, we
have two possibilities for defining the exporting cut-offs:
Case 1: If all the exporting cut-offs are higher than the domestic cut-off in country i, that is
if φ∗iii < φ∗kii ∀k, then the domestic and the exporting cut-offs are well calculated. Firms with
productivities φ∗iii < φ < φ∗kii only sell in the domestic market, while firms with productivities
φ > φ∗kii sell domestically and export.
13Using assumption 1, I can extend the results from Melitz (2003) considering multinational production and
BMP just as an additional activity which simplifies the problem.
14It can be that in the end activities are not fully independent, but I can compute costs and profits for each
activity as if they were fully independent.
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Case 2: If at least one exporting cut-off φ∗kii is lower than the domestic cut-off φ
∗
iii, then we
have to re-calculate cut-offs. Denote Kxi the set of countries k for which the exporting cut-off
(from country i to country k) is lower than the domestic cut-off. For countries k ∈ Kxi the
exporting cut-off is equal to the domestic cut-off (φ∗iii = φ∗kii). The marginal firm entering in the
domestic market (with productivity φ∗iii) makes negative profits selling in the domestic market
but these negative profits are compensated by the positive profits obtained by exporting to
countries k ∈ Kxi . Then, the productivity cut-off defined in the marginal entrant (φ∗iii) solves
the following equation:
πiii(φ
∗
iii) +
￿
k∈Kx
πkii(φ
∗
iii) = 0. (1.9)
Now let us consider the possibility for MP. Allowing for MP brings new cases for the way the
domestic cut-off is defined. The profit for a firm from country i producing and selling in country
k (performing MP in country k) is given by:
πkki(φ) =
E1kP
σ−1
k
σ
￿
ρφ
wkγki
￿σ−1
− κMPk wk (1.10)
To fix ideas, let us ignore the possibility of exporting. We want to focus on how MP affects the
calculation of the domestic cut-off. There are two cases again to consider:
Case 3: If all the MP cut-offs are higher than the domestic cut-off in country i, that is if
φ∗iii < φ∗kki ∀k, then the domestic and the MP cut-offs are well calculated. Firms with produc-
tivities φ∗iii < φ < φ∗kki only sell in the domestic market, while firms with productivities φ > φ
∗
kki
sell domestically and perform MP.
Case 4: If at least one MP cut-off (φ∗kki) is lower than the domestic cut-off, then we need to
follow similar steps as in case 2. Denote byKMPki the set of countries (k) for which the MP cut-off
in country i (φ∗kki) is lower than the domestic cut-off in country i (φ
∗
iii). For countries k ∈ KMPki
the MP cut-off is equal to the domestic cut-off φ∗kki = φ
∗
iii. The marginal firm entering in the
domestic market (with productivity φ∗iii) makes negative profits selling in the domestic market
but these negative profits are compensated by the positive profits obtained by performing MP
in countries k ∈ KMPki . Then, the productivity of the marginal entrant in country i solves the
following equation:
πiii(φ
∗
iii) +
￿
k∈KMPki
πkki(φ
∗
iii) = 0 (1.11)
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If we assume that firms can export and do MP, the procedure is the same. The only difference
is that if we have exporting cut-offs and MP cut-offs that are below the domestic cut-off, then
the the productivity of the marginal entrant in country i solves the following equation:
πiii(φ
∗
iii) +
￿
k∈Kx
πkii(φ
∗
iii) +
￿
k∈KMPki
πkki(φ
∗
iii) = 0 (1.12)
Finally, a firm may want to use a third country as an export platform (BMP). The profit for a
firm from country i, producing in country k and selling in country j is given by:
πjki(φ) =
E1jP
σ−1
j
σ
￿
ρφ
wkγkiτjk
￿σ−1
− κxkwk (1.13)
Setting the above equation to zero, we can find the BMP cut-off productivity (φ∗jki) for a firm
from country i producing in country k and selling in country j. As in the previous cases we have
two cases:
Case 5 If all the BMP cut-off productivities for firms from country i producing in country k
(φ∗jki ∀j) are above the MP cut-off productivity for firms from country i producing in country
k (φ∗kki), then the BMP cut-offs are well calculated. Firms with productivities φ
∗
kki < φ < φ
∗
jki
sell domestically and produce and sell in country k, while firms with productivities φ > φ∗jki sell
domestically, produce and sell in country k and also do BMP from country k to country j.
Case 6 If at least one BMP cut-off for firms from country i producing in country k (φ∗jki ∀j)
is below the MP cut-off productivity for firms from country i producing in country k (φ∗kki),
then we have to re-calculate the MP cut-off φ∗kki. Define J
BMP
ki the set of countries for which
the BMP cut-off (φ∗jki) is lower than the MP cut-off (φ
∗
kki). Then cut-off productivity for the
marginal firm from country i performing MP in country k and BMP to country j solves:
πkki(φ
∗
kki) +
￿
j∈JBMPki
πjki(φ
∗
kki) = 0 (1.14)
As firms performing BMP has to pay the fixed cost of producing abroad (κMP ) also, there will
be no firm performing BMP and not MP, which implies that the equilibrium BMP cut-off is not
going to be below the MP cut-off. In Appendix 3 I present the algorithm to calculate the cut-offs.
Profits
In summary, if φ∗iii < φ∗kii, φ
∗
iii < φ
∗
kki and φ
∗
kki < φ
∗
jki all the cut-offs are the ones that come
from equating the profit from each activity to zero, and so the marginal firm performing each
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activity makes zero profit. Otherwise the marginal firm entering in the domestic market can
be making negative profits in the domestic market and compensate these negative profits with
positive profits in other activities, like exporting or MP or both. Then, the profit made by a
firm from country i is given by: to define profits I need to use an indicator that allows me to
know if an activity is operative or not
πi(φ) = πiii(φ) +
￿
k ￿=i
πkii(φ)I
x
kii +
￿
k ￿=i
πkki(φ)I
MP
kki +
￿
k ￿=i
￿
j ￿=k
πjki(φ)I
BMP
jki , (1.15)
where Ixkii is an indicator function that takes the value 1 if φ > φ
∗
kii and 0 otherwise, I
MP
kki is
an indicator function that takes the value 1 if φ > φ∗kki and 0 otherwise, and finally I
BMP
jki is
an indicator function that takes the value 1 if φ > φ∗jki and 0.
15 Note that for a firm with
productivity φ it can be possible that the profit for some activities are negative. For example, it
can happen that for this firm the profit of opening a plant in country k and selling to country k
(πkki(φ), but the profit of producing in country k and selling to country j are positive and more
than compensates the negative profit. Finally, as profits from every activity are increasing in φ
(since σ − 1 > 0), more productive firms make higher profits, and so if the productivity is high
enough a firm performs all the activities.
1.3.4.2 Productivity distribution
Productivities are drawn from a Pareto distribution with scale parameter φmi and shape param-
eter αi.16 Lets define the density function as gi(φ) = αi
(φmi )
αi
φαi+1
. As only firms with productivities
above φ∗iii will produce in country i, then the equilibrium distribution of productivities of do-
mestic firms is:
µi(φ) =
gi(φ)
1−G(φ∗iii)
if φ ≥ φ∗iii , (1.16)
and 0 otherwise. The conditional probability of performing each of the other activities is:
Exporting to country k ⇒ θkii = 1−G(φ
∗
kii)
1−G(φ∗iii)
Doing FDI in country k ⇒ θkki = 1−G(φ
∗
kki)
1−G(φ∗iii)
Doing BMP in k to sell in j ⇒ θjki =
1−G(φ∗jki)
1−G(φ∗iii)
The average productivity for each activity can be calculated as:
15In the calibrated model economies there are no exporting or MP cut-offs lower than the domestic cut-off.
However, there are some BMP cut-offs smaller than the MP cut-offs.
16In a Pareto distribution the scale parameter indicates the minimum value that the random variable can take.
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φ˜jki =
￿￿ ∞
φ∗jki
φσ−1µi(φ)dφ
￿1/(σ−1)
(1.17)
for all i, j and k. Notice that φ˜jki only depends on the cut-off productivity.
Following Melitz (2003), we can consider that for each activity there is a representative firm with
productivity φ˜jki. The average productivity φ˜jki summarizes all the information concerning each
activity. This is convenient because now aggregate variables for each activity can be expressed
in terms of φ˜jki. One difference with respect to the case of Melitz (2003) is that in his case
it is possible to calculate an average productivity for the whole economy that only depends on
domestic firms. In this paper, the average productivity of a country will be given by the domestic
firms producing domestically and also by foreign firms producing domestically. Then, aggregate
variables for the whole economy will depend not only on the domestic mass of firms but also on
the mass of firms from the rest of countries.
Evaluating revenues at the average productivity level and making the ratio of this revenue with
a revenue evaluated at any other productivity level we find that:
r(φ˜iii)
riii(φ)
=
E1i P
σ−1
i
￿
ρφ˜iii
wi
￿σ−1
E1i P
σ−1
i
￿
ρφ
wi
￿σ−1 ⇒ r(φ˜iii) =
￿
φ˜iii
φ
￿σ−1
riii(φ) (1.18)
We can get the previous relation for each activity: exporting, doing MP and doing BMP.
Exporting to country k ⇒ r(φ˜kii) =
￿
φ˜kii
φ
￿σ−1
rkii(φ)
Doing MP in country k ⇒ r(φ˜kki) =
￿
φ˜kki
φ
￿σ−1
rkki(φ)
Doing BMP in k to sell in j ⇒ r(φ˜jki) =
￿
φ˜jki
φ
￿σ−1
rjki(φ)
1.3.4.3 Sales distribution
Sales for a given activity are given by rjki = E1j
￿
Pjρφ
wkγkiτjk
￿σ−1
, where E1j is aggregate expen-
diture in differentiated goods in country j. Given that productivities are drawn from a Pareto
distribution it is possible to obtain the distribution of sales for each activity analytically. I will
present the result for domestic firms selling domestically, but the expression is analog for the
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other activities.
prob(riii(φ) > y) = prob
￿
E1i
￿
Piρφ
wi
￿σ−1
> y
￿
= prob
￿
φ >
￿
y
E1i
￿ wi
1−σ wi
Piρ
￿
.
As φ is distributed Pareto we can calculate this probability to be
prob(riii(φ) > y) =
 φmi￿
y
E1i
￿ 1
1−σ wi
Piρ

α
,
where φm,i is the scale parameter (the minimum value that φ can take) of the Pareto distribution.
We can write the above expression as:
prob(riii(φ) > y) =
￿
(E1i )
1/(σ−1)(Piρφmi /wi)
y1/(σ−1)
￿α
prob(riii(φ) > y) =
￿
E1i (Piρφ
m
i /wi)
(σ−1)
y
￿α/(σ−1)
prob(riii(φ) > y) =
￿
rmi
y
￿α/(σ−1)
where rmi (φ
m
i ) = E
1
i (Piρφ
m
i )
σ−1 is the revenue of a firm from country i with productivity equal to
φm,i producing and selling domestically. Then riii(φ) is distributed Pareto with scale parameter
rm,i and shape parameter α/(σ− 1). This would be the distribution of sales if all the firms were
producing. But, as we stated previously, there will be some firms (the ones with productivity
between φm,i and φ∗iii) which are not going to produce. Then, the true distribution of sales will
be a truncation of the previous distribution. The Pareto distribution has the property that if it is
truncated, the remaining distribution is still Pareto with the same shape parameter. Then sales
(riii(φ)) are distributed Pareto with scale parameter riii(φ∗) and shape parameter α/(σ − 1),
where riii(φ∗) are the sales of a firm with the cut-off productivity.
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For the rest of activities we can operate in a similar way and we obtain:
Exporting firms⇒ prob(rkii > y) =
E1k
￿
Pkρφmi
wkτki
￿(σ−1)
y

α/(σ−1)
Doing FDI in country k ⇒ prob(rkki > y) =
E1k
￿
Pkρφmi
wkγki
￿(σ−1)
y

α/(σ−1)
Doing BMP in k to sell in j ⇒ prob(rjki > y) =
E1j
￿
Pjρφmi
wkτjkγki
￿(σ−1)
y

α/(σ−1)
where the numerator of each equation are the sales for each activity that correspond to the
minimum productivity level. As in the case of domestic sales, the equilibrium distribution of
sales for each activity is going to be Pareto with shape parameter α/(σ−1) and scale parameter
r(φ∗jki), where r(φ
∗
jki) is sales of a firm with the cut-off productivity level for a firm from country
i producing in country k and selling to country j.
1.3.4.4 Average Profits
Replacing (1.17) in the profit equations we can calculate average profits in terms of average
productivities. In the case that each individual activity makes zero profit at the cut-off level, we
can calculate average profit for each activity as:
Selling Domestically⇒ π¯iii = κdiwi
￿ φ˜iii
φ∗iii
￿σ−1
− 1

Exporting from the home country⇒ π¯kii = κxi wi
￿ φ˜kii
φ∗kii
￿σ−1
− 1

Doing MP in country k ⇒ π¯kki = κMPk wk
￿ φ˜kki
φ∗kki
￿σ−1
− 1

Doing BMP in k to sell in j ⇒ π¯jki = κxkwk
￿ φ˜jki
φ∗jki
￿σ−1
− 1

If the profit at the cut-off level is not zero, then the average profit for that activity is obtained
using equation (1.18). We can calculate the average profit of a firm from country i as:
π¯i = π¯iii +
￿
k ￿=i
θkiiπ¯kii +
￿
k ￿=i
θkkiπ¯kki +
￿
k ￿=j
￿
k ￿=i
θjkiπ¯jki . (1.19)
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Notice that profits are a function of aggregate expenditures E1i . Aggregate expenditure is de-
termined, among other factors, by the population size. Hence, the profitability of a foreign firm
depends on the selling country size. Given two countries with similar variable and fixed trade
costs, a multinational plant will prefer to get installed in the bigger country. As a result, a small
country will attract less investment than a bigger one. For example, assume that the country
where the good is going to be consumed is Uruguay, and a firm from Japan is considering the
different possibilities of serving Uruguay. If the fixed export cost in Japan is high, then it could
be better to produce the good directly in Uruguay. This will be the case if the fixed cost to open
a subsidiary in Uruguay is not very high and also the productivity loss for producing abroad
(γUru,Jap) is low. Now, imagine that Japan is also considering to sell to Argentina, and that
the productivity loss of producing in Argentina for a Japanese firm is the same as in Uruguay
γArg,Jap = γUru,Jap. Then, as Argentina is bigger, E1Arg > E
1
Uru. If aggregate prices, wages,
and fixed costs are not very different, the Japanese firm will prefer to produce in Argentina to
producing in Uruguay. In other words, the productivity required by a Japanese firm to start
producing in Argentina is lower (ceteris paribus) than the one required to produce in Uruguay.
This implies that more firms get located in Argentina. Size, then, is crucial to attract foreign
investment.
1.3.4.5 Mass of Firms
Define M ei to be the total mass of firms making a productivity draw in country i, and Mi as the
mass of firms finally operating. By definition, the total mass of firms operating should be equal
to the total mass of firms making a productivity draw times the probability of successful entry,
which is θiiiM ei =Mi.
In the case of an open economy without FDI we can obtain Mi in the same way as in Melitz
(2003). Mi = Ri/r¯i, where Ri = wiLi denotes aggregate revenue and aggregate expenditure, and
r¯i denotes average revenue. In Melitz (2003), aggregate revenue and total payment to labor are
equal because total profits (Π) are equal to the payment to labor used in making the productivity
draw (κeiwi) in equilibrium and only domestic firms produce in country i.
When foreign firms are allowed to produce in the domestic country Ri ￿= wiLi. The equality
does not hold because foreign firms send their profits abroad, and domestic firms producing
abroad bring their profits home, making total expenditure in the country also a function of
profits of domestic firms abroad. However, it is still true that wiLei = Πi (where L
e
i is labor
used in entering) 17, but the determination for labor used in production (Lpi ) is different. Now
the total payment to labor in country i is equal to revenue minus profits of firms producing in
17 This is obtained using the equation for total payment to labor used in entering and the free entry condition,
which I explain later.
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i, which can include foreign firms. In equations, wiL
p
i = Rˆi − Πˆi where Rˆi and Πˆi are revenues
and profits of firms producing in country i (domestic or foreign).
The total mass of firms performing each of the other activities is obtained by multiplying the mass
of firms operating, Mi, by the conditional probability of performing the activity Mjki = θjkiMi.
1.3.4.6 Aggregation
We define aggregate price and GDP in country i as:
Pi =
￿￿
φ∗iii
(piii(φ))
1−σMiµi(φ)dφ+
￿
k ￿=i
￿
φ∗ikk
(pikk(φ))
1−σMkµk(φ)dφ (1.20)
+
￿
k ￿=i
￿
φ∗iik
(piik(φ))
1−σMkµk(φ)dφ+
￿
k ￿=j
￿
k ￿=i
￿
φ∗ikj
(pikj(φ))
1−σMjµj(φ)dφ
￿ 1
1−σ
,
GDPi =
￿
φ∗iii
riii(φ)Miµidφ+
￿
k ￿=i
￿
φ∗kii
rkii(φ)Miµidφ+
￿
k ￿=i
￿
φ∗iik
riik(φ)Mkµkdφ
+
￿
k ￿=j
￿
k ￿=i
￿
φ∗kij
rkij(φ)Mjµjdφ . (1.21)
We can re-write the aggregate price and GDP of country i in terms of weighted average pro-
ductivities.18 Lets define Mpi as the mass of firms producing in country and M
s
i as the mass of
firms selling goods to country i. Then,
Mpi = Mi +
￿
k ￿=i
Miik +
￿
k ￿=i
￿
i ￿=j
Mjik ,
M si = Mi +
￿
k ￿=i
Miik +
￿
k ￿=j
￿
i ￿=j
Mijk . (1.22)
18Following Melitz (2003).
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Having defined the mass of firms producing and selling in each country we can define the weighted
average productivity of firms producing (φ˜pi ) and selling (φ˜
s
i ) as:
φ˜pi =
￿
1
Mpi
￿
Miiiφ˜
σ−1
iii +
￿
k ￿=i
Mkii
E1k
E1i
￿
Pk
τkiPi
￿σ−1
φ˜σ−1kii +
￿
k ￿=i
Miik
￿
1
γik
￿σ−1
φ˜σ−1iik
+
￿
k ￿=i
￿
i ￿=j
Mjik
E1j
E1i
￿
Pj
τjiγik
￿σ−1
φ˜σ−1jik
￿￿ 1σ−1
, (1.23)
φ˜si =
￿
1
M si
￿
Miiiφ˜
σ−1
iii +
￿
k ￿=i
Mikk
￿
wkτik
wi
￿1−σ
φ˜σ−1ikk +
￿
k ￿=i
Miikγ
1−σ
ik φ˜
σ−1
iik
+
￿
k ￿=i
￿
i ￿=j
Mijk
￿
τijγjkwk
wi
￿1−σ
φ˜σ−1ijk
￿￿ 1σ−1
. (1.24)
Using these two equations we can define aggregate price and aggregate production in the differ-
entiated good sector in country i as:19
Pi = (M
s
i )
1
1−σ p(φ˜si ) = (M
s
i )
1
1−σ
wi
ρφ˜si
, (1.25)
GDPi = M
p
i Ei
￿
Piρφ˜
p
i
wi
￿σ−1
. (1.26)
1.3.5 Trade and Multinational Production
Trade of a country will be given by the amount of exports and imports. Exports are composed
by all the sales to foreign countries from firms (either domestic or foreign) producing in the
domestic country. The expression for total exports in the differentiated good sector is given by:
Exportsi = Xi =
￿
k ￿=i
Mkiirkii(φ˜kii)￿ ￿￿ ￿
Exports by Domestic Firms
+
￿
k ￿=i
￿
k ￿=j
Mjikrjik(φ˜jik)￿ ￿￿ ￿
Exports by Foreign Firms
.
In a similar way, imports in the differentiated good sector are all the goods consumed in the
domestic country and produced in a foreign country. So total imports are:
Importsi = IMi =
￿
k ￿=i
Mikkrikk(φ˜ikk) +
￿
k ￿=i
￿
k ￿=j
Mijkrijk(φ˜ijk) .
19Proof in the appendix
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The capital account is composed by the difference between the profits of domestic firms producing
abroad and the profits of foreign firms producing in the domestic country.
Capital Accounti =
￿
k
￿
j ￿=i
Mkjiπ¯kji −
￿
k
￿
j ￿=i
Mkijπ¯kij .
The Current Account (CA) is the sum of Trade Balance (TB) TBi = (zi−qi0)+Xi−IMi where
(zi− qi0) is net exports of the homogeneous good, and the capital account balance. The current
account balance equation can be written as:
CAi = (zi − qi0) +Xi − IMi +
￿
k
￿
j ￿=i
Mkjiπ¯kji −
￿
k
￿
j ￿=i
Mkijπ¯kij . (1.27)
1.3.6 Equilibrium
Equation (1.19) defines the Zero Cut-off Profit Condition (ZCPC), which expresses the average
profit of a firm from country i as a function of the domestic cut-offs, the mass of firms operating
in each country, and wages. The net value of a firm from country i is then vi = π¯i. As there is
free entry, the expected profit of a firm before making a draw should be zero, otherwise more
firms will enter until this condition is satisfied. Define the net value of an entering firm as vei . In
equilibrium vei should be equal to zero. Then the free entry condition (FEC) can be expressed
as:
vei = θiiiπ¯i − κeiwi = 0 , (1.28)
which says that the average value of a firm producing in country i times the probability of
successful entry should be equal to the entry cost (the cost of making the productivity draw).
θiii is a function of the scale (φmi ) and shape (α) parameters of the productivity distribution and
of the domestic cut-off (φ∗iii). Rearranging terms in equation (1.28) we get π¯i =
κeiwi
θiii
.
In order to solve for the equilibrium we need to find 3 ∗ N + 1 variables: N cut-offs (φiii ∀i);
N numbers for the mass of firms for each country (Mi ∀i); N wages (wi) and 1 price (p0)
. Normalizing the price of the homogeneous good to one we end up with 3 ∗ N endogenous
variables. The set of 3 ∗Nequations are given by:
• Free entry condition equal to zero cut-off profit condition.
• Current account balance condition.
• Labor market clearing condition.
Definition: Given zi0, τij, γij, κei , κ
d
i , κ
x
i , κ
MP
i , gi(φ), Li and N ∀i, j = 1, ..., N , a multina-
tional production equilibrium is a set of wages wi, price indices, Pi, income, GNPi,mass of
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firms Mi, mass of entrants, M ei , allocations for the representative consumer qjki(φ) and prices,
pjki(φ), for firms such that:
1. In all countries, given prices and aggregate expenditure, consumers demand choices (qjki(φ)
and qio) satisfy (1.2) and (1.3).
2. In all countries, firms maximize profits from all activities (equation (1.5) solves (1.4)).
3. Pi satisfies equation (1.20)
4. Labor markets clear.
5. Free entry condition: vei = 0 (see equation (1.28)).
6. Current Account balance condition is zero (see equation (1.27)).
7. The mass of firms producing is equal to the mass of firms taking the productivity draw
times the probability that the draw is bigger than the domestic cut-off,
Mi = θiiiM ei
8. World demand of the homogeneous good is equal to world supply:
￿
i zi =
￿
i qi0.
1.4 Calibration
1.4.1 Data
I use data from four different sources to calibrate the model: The World Bank Enterprise Survey
(WBES), the United Nations (UNCTAD), OECD Stan, and the database on bilateral trade flows
from Waugh (2010).
World Bank Enterprise Survey: This database is a stratified sample of the universe of firms
in developing countries. I use the standardized survey, which has data starting in 2006. This
database is being updated continuously, and for many countries there is a panel of two years
already. I use this database to obtain statistics related to firms’ performance for South American
countries : a) proportion of exporting firms; b) proportion of foreign firms. I consider only firms
in the manufacturing sector.
UNCTAD: I use the Foreign Direct Investment profile for the Latin-American countries under
study. I use data on the origin of the stock of FDI by country.
OECD Stan: I use data on the production by multinational firms and proportion of firms
exporting for Europe.
Chapter 1. Asymmetric Effects of Trade and FDI 21
Waugh(2010): This data base contains information on trade for a large set of countries for
the year 1996, including Latin-American and European countries. I use trade statistics (exports
and imports) by origin and destiny in order to construct bilateral trade flows between countries
and the absorption measure reported.
1.4.2 Calibration Strategy:
I calibrate the model separately for two regions: South America and Europe. I select these
regions because they both present very different trade arrangements. While South America is
characterized by high trade barriers, Europe is well known as a low trade barriers’ area for the
members of the European Union. Analyzing the differences in the gains from openness in these
two regions for countries of different size provides information on how much countries in the
close region are loosing compare to the ones in the open region, and how much could be the
potential gains of becoming more open. To maintain symmetry I will include in both calibration
five countries, four belonging to the region and a fifth which stands for the rest of the world
(RW). The countries included in each regions are (i) Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay in South
America; and (ii)France, Italy, Netherlands and United Kingdom in Europe.
I will use data for 1996 whenever it is possible.20 OECD Stan database has information on sales
of multinationals only for the late 2000’s. I will use data for 2007 which is the earliest year for
which they have data for all countries. The parameters I need to calibrate are:
• Size (Li): I use data from the UNCTAD on labor force. I normalize Uruguay’s size to
1 (LUru = 1). Countries sizes are then LArg = 9.47, LBra = 48.94, LChi = 3.69 and
LRW = 1582.5.21 For Europe country sizes are: LFra = 16.8, LIta = 14.9, LUK = 18.7
and the LRW = 1567.3.
• Substitutability between varieties (σ): I use a value of 6 which generates a mark-up
of 20%, as is common in the literature (for example in Ghironi and Melitz (2005)).
• Productivity distribution: I assume that productivities are drawn from a Pareto dis-
tribution with scale parameter φm = 1 for all countries. I will assume that all countries
have the same shape parameter α. Given the Pareto assumption for productivities, sales
are distributed Pareto with shape parameter α/(σ − 1). There is a large discussion in the
literature about the value of α and α/(σ−1). Chaney (2008) finds that αi/(σ−1) is around
2 for the US, but he does not calculate the value of α and σ. Ramondo and Rappoport
(2010) use α = 4. Breinlich and Cun˜at (2010) estimates α/(σ− 1) and find values ranging
20In 1995 the MERCOSUR members should have had the last reduction in tariffs for trade within the region,
and a common tariff for the rest of the world. For a more detailed discussion on this see Bustos (2011).
21To calculate the RW I take out Russia and Germany from all the variables, two big countries not included in
Waugh (2010).
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from 1.13 to 4.88. Arkolakis, Ramondo, Rodriguez-Clare, and Yeaple (2013) use α = 4.2.
Finally, Arkolakis and Muendler (2010) estimates α/(σ − 1) from Brazilian data and find
a value of 1.21. I use the estimate of Arkolakis and Muendler (2010) for two reasons.
First, because they estimate the shape parameter of sales from Brazilian data, one of the
countries I am studying. Second, because σ = 6 implies α = 6.05 which is in the middle
range of previous estimates.
• Fixed entry cost (κei ): In order to make a productivity draw, firms in country i should
pay a fixed cost κei . I calibrate this parameter to match the GDP per capita in each country
relative to the RW for the year 1996.
• Fixed operating cost (κdi ): If a firm decides to operate, it has to pay a fixed cost (κdi ).
I will set the value of this parameter such that the smallest firm producing in each country
demands 10 workers. The amount of labor demanded by the smallest firm is:
￿(φ∗iii) = σκ
d
i . (1.29)
As equation (1.29) shows, labor demand of the firm with productivity level equal to the
domestic cut-off productivity only depends on σ and κdi .
22 As all countries have the same
σ, all countries should have the same κdi in order to obtain that the smallest firm demands
ten workers in all countries. I thus set κdi = 10/6 for all i.
• Fixed cost of exporting (κxi ): In order to export, a firm has to pay an additional fixed
cost (κxi ). This cost directly affects the mass of firms deciding to export. I will use the
proportion of firms exporting as a fraction of the total number of operating firms. For
South America I use firm-level data from the World Bank Enterprise Survey to calculate
this statistic in the data. For Europe, I use the OECD Stan dataset.
• Fixed cost of doing MP (κMPi ): To operate in a foreign country, a firm has to pay
a fixed cost of (κMPi ) in the country where the firm will open the plant. I will calibrate
this parameter to match the proportion of foreign firms in a given country. As this cost
increases, the proportion of foreign firms decreases. I use data from the World Bank
Enterprise Survey to construct this statistic in the data for South America and OECD
Stan for Europe.
• Iceberg cost of exporting (τji): In order to deliver one unit to country j, firm in
country i has to deliver τji units. These parameters are pinned down to target Tradeji
over Absorptioni23 across the countries in my study. I use data from Waugh (2010) on
trade of manufactures to construct these targets.
22See proof in the appendix.
23 Tradeji is imports of country i from country j plus exports from country i to country j. Absorption is
calculated as GDPi + Importsi − Exportsi.
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• Productivity shifter (γji): When a firm produces abroad the productivity of a firm is
shift by γji. The new productivity for a firm from country i producing in country j is
φˆ = φγji To calibrate this parameter I use the proportion of sales from foreign firms in the
domestic country. I do not allow firms from the countries in the sample to perform FDI in
the rest of the world. Using data from the WBES I compute the participation of foreign
sales on total sales. Unfortunately, this database does not have the country of origin of
foreign firms. So, I use the composition of FDI stock in manufactures to impute these
values. The data on FDI stock in manufactures come from the UNCTAD Foreign Direct
Investment profile for South America and OECD Stan for Europe.
• Endowment of the homogeneous good (zi): I use the trade deficit in the manufac-
turing sector to calibrate this parameter.
1.4.3 Calibration Results
Tables 1.1 to 1.6 present the calibrated parameters. Panel A of each table presents the results
for South America, while Panel B presents the results for Europe. The model performs well in
matching the selected targets. The GDP per capita of the RW is normalized to 1. To match
the much higher GDP per capita in Europe relative to the RW (see Table 1.6), I need to impose
much lower entry costs in Europe than in South America (second column of Table 1.1). Table
1.2 shows that the model also matches the trade balance over absorption in the manufacturing
sector, even though it slightly overestimates Italian trade surplus (9.5 in the model versus 8.9 in
data). For the proportion of firms exporting (first column of Table 1.1) and the participation of
foreign firms sales in total sales (Table 1.5), the model is able to match the data almost perfectly
for all countries.
To match the trade statistics I use variable and fixed trade costs. Note that Argentina and
Brazil, the two largest countries in South America, show lower ratios of Trade-to-Absorption,
35.8% and 22.8% respectively. On the other hand, Chile and Uruguay, the smallest countries,
show much higher ratios: 59.4% and 58.3%. In order to match the large proportion of domestic
firms exporting in Argentina, the model requires small fixed cost of exporting for this country
(see column four of Table 1.1). This also allows smaller firms to enter in the export market,
making it possible to match at the same time the large proportion of firms exporting and the
relatively low trade-to-absorption ratio. The importance of the RW as a trade partner is also
shown in the calibrated parameters. Participation of the RW in trade goes from 51% for Uruguay
to 86% for Chile. As a result Chile, with high variable trade cost of exporting to the rest of
South American countries, presents low average variable trade cost (compared to the levels of
Argentina and Brazil around 100%). Uruguay is the country of the region with the highest
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average variable trade costs (124%), something unexpected since it is the smallest country.24
For Europe we can immediately observe that trade-to-absorption is much higher than in South
America. Italy, the country with the lowest ratio has a value of 44.1%, while the Netherlands,
the country with the highest ratio, exhibits a ratio of 118.1%. In order to match the higher
ratio, the model requires much smaller trade costs. This is shown in Figure 1.3, which shows
the average trade costs by country (both the simple average or a weighted by trade composition
average). It can be easily seen that South American countries face much higher average trade
costs than European countries. The weighted average trade cost in South America is 111% (so
the average variable cost is τ = 2.11), while in Europe it is 65% (the average variable cost in
Europe is τ = 1.649). Another interesting fact is that while in Europe the smallest country, the
Netherlands, faces the lowest trade cost, in South America the smallest country, Uruguay, faces
the highest average trade costs.
Similar observations apply to multinational production.25 As in the case of trade costs, the
efficiency parameter γ is much higher for South America than Europe (see Table 1.5). This
implies that foreign firms are much less productive operating abroad in South America than in
Europe. The average value of this parameter is 1.92 in South America, while is 0.58 in Europe.
The fact that in Europe the average γ is smaller than one is mainly driven by the productivity of
firms from the RW operating abroad. Firms from the RW operating in Europe are three times
more efficient than in their domestic countries. Then, as most of the MP comes from the RW,
the average γ in Europe is smaller than one.
To sum up, the baseline model is consistent with cross country evidence on bilateral trade flows
and multinational production for the set of selected countries. South America faces higher trade
barriers than Europe, and this trade barriers vary with country size among regions. While the
smallest country in Europe (the Netherlands) is the one with the smallest average trade costs,
Uruguay, the smallest country in south America is the one with the highest average trade cost.
Also, South American countries can not attract as much MP as European countries because the
productivity of multinationals operating in South America is much lower than the productivity
of multinationals operating in Europe.
1.5 Experiments
I use the calibrated model to perform a set of counterfactual experiments. First, I investigate
how much countries benefit from trade and MP by closing the economies (a world in autarky),
and study the role played by MP and BMP in countries of different size. Then, I reduce trade
and MP costs in South America and study the potential gains in real GDP. Finally, I analyze
24Small countries are those who benefit the most from openness according to traditional trade theory
25I set a value of 100 to γij when there are zeros in the data
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the role of trade and MP in shaping the distribution of firm size in countries of different size in
the two regions. In summary, I will quantitative study the following:
1. To assess the low gains from trade and MP attained by South America relative to Europe,
I compute the losses (changes in real manufacturing GDP and GNP) of moving to autarky
in South America relative to Europe.
2. To assess the role played by MP and BMP in explaining the previous results I perform
three exercises:
• To assess the role played by BMP, I compare the losses of moving to autarky in a
world with and without BMP.
• To assess the role of MP itself (without including BMP), I set up a world without
BMP, and compare the losses of moving to autarky with and without MP.
• To assess the role played by MP as a whole (including BMP), I compare the losses of
moving to autarky in a world with and without MP.
3. To assess the potential gains from an improvement in the degree of openness in South
America, I compute the changes in real manufacturing GDP and GNP of decreasing trade
costs in South America to the average level in Europe with three different configuration:
• Maintaining the same multinational production costs.
• Increasing the efficiency of foreign firms producing in South America by 20%.
• Increasing the efficiency of foreign firms producing only in Uruguay by 20%.
4. To assess the effects of MP and trade on firm size distribution, I compute the proportion
of firms with more than 100 and 250 employees in the baseline economy, in an economy
without MP and in an economy in autarky.
1.5.1 Gains from Openness
To study the gains from openness, I close the economies to trade and MP (a world in autarky).
In autarky, γij = τij = ∞. The first two columns of Table 1.7 present the changes in real
manufacturing GDP and GNP using as benchmark the calibrated model economies. Panel A
presents the results for South America and Panel B for Europe. Losses of moving to autarky
in Europe are much larger than in South America (10.5% versus 5.3% of real GDP) which
indicates that Europe benefits much more from openness than South America. This is expected
since trade costs are higher and efficiency of foreign firms is lower in South America compared
to Europe. Small countries lose more than large countries in both regions. The higher degree
of openness in Europe results in larger differences between the country that loses the most and
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the country that loses the least compared to South America. In Europe, the Netherlands loses
20.3% of real GDP and Italy loses 5.6% (almost 15 percentage points difference), while in South
America, the difference between the losses of Uruguay and Brazil is 8.5 percentage points.
The last two columns of Table 1.7 present the changes in real manufacturing GDP and GNP
using as benchmark a modified version of the baseline economy, an economy where BMP is not
allowed. Allowing for BMP introduces an extra possibility for foreign firms, the possibility of
using a third country as an export platform. However, the extent to which they will be able to
benefit from exports will be determined by trade barriers. Comparing the results of the third
column, to the one of the first column, we can see that BMP is more important in small countries
than in large countries, and that European countries benefit more from BMP. The losses for the
Netherlands in a world without BMP are 3.3 p.p lower than in the benchmark economy, while for
Uruguay are only 1.2 p.p. lower. Then, high trade barriers not only affect exports of domestic
firms but also exports of foreign firms, and as a result the ability of small countries to attract
multinational firms.
1.5.1.1 The role played by MP and BMP
To disentangle the role played by MP and BMP in the gains from openness, I perform three
experiments. The results of these three exercises are presented in Table 1.8.
To assess the role played by BMP in explaining the gains from openness, I compute the ratio
between the losses of going to autarky in the baseline economy and the losses of going to autarky
in a world without BMP. If this ratio is 1 it means that BMP plays no role in explaining the gains
from openness, while BMP becomes more important as this ratio increases. The first column of
Table 1.8 presents the results. The ratio is larger for small countries than for large countries,
and also tends to be higher in Europe than in South America. In Uruguay the losses of going
to autarky in the baseline economy are 11.2% higher than in the case without BMP and in the
Netherlands this number goes up to 19.9%, while for Brazil and Italy this ratio is 1.035 and
1.097 respectively. Then, small countries benefit more from BMP as expected.
To assess the role played by MP itself (this means MP without the possibility of BMP), I
compute the ratio between the losses of going to autarky in a world without BMP and the losses
of going to autarky in a world without MP. This ratio shows the importance of MP itself in
explaining the gains from MP as a whole. If the ratio is close to 1 it means that the gains from
MP mostly come through BMP, while as this ratio increases it means that MP itself becomes
more important (and as a result BMP becomes less important) in explaining the gains from MP.
The second column of Table 1.8 presents the results. In Europe, Italy loses 84% more going to
autarky in a world without MP compared to a world without BMP, but the Netherlands only
loses 20% more. As expected MP itself is more important in explaining the gains from MP in
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the large country than in the small one. In South America both Brazil and Uruguay present the
same ratio 1.51. This happens because the efficiency of multinationals firms operating in Brazil
is very low, and so MP is not a very cheap way of overcoming trade barriers. However, another
large country like Argentina has a ratio much higher (2.033) than the one of Uruguay.
Finally, to asses the role played by MP through both channels, I compute the ratio between
the losses of going to autarky in the baseline economy and the losses of going to autarky in a
world without MP. If this ratio is 1 it means that MP plays no role in explaining the gains from
openness, while as it increases it means that MP becomes more important in explaining the gains
from openness. The third column of Table 1.8 presents the results. Large countries display the
highest gains from MP. In South America the country that benefits the most is Argentina and
in Europe Italy. In Europe, the country that benefit the least from MP is the Netherlands, the
smallest country, while in South America is Brazil the largest country. The underlying message
is the same as in the previous exercise: since in Brazil the efficiency of multinational firms is
low, the role played by MP is lower. Also, as South America as a region is closed then the gains
from trade are not very large which increases the importance of MP in explaining the gains from
openness.
To sum up, if countries face relatively low trade costs and high efficiency of foreign firms, large
countries benefit more from MP as a whole, with small countries benefitting more from BMP.
On the other hand, if trade costs are high and the efficiency of multinationals is low the large
country may not benefit from MP more than the small country.
1.5.2 Reducing trade costs and improving efficiency
To study the potential gains in South America of an improvement in the degree of openness,
I reduce the average trade costs for all countries in the calibration for South America to the
average level in Europe (τ = 1.64).26
Panel A of Table 1.9 presents the result of only reducing trade costs in South America to the
average level in Europe (i.e. imposing τ = 1.64 to all South American countries). All countries
gain by reducing trade costs, but the smallest country, Uruguay, gains significantly more. The
gains in Uruguay are 29.9% of real manufacturing GDP, while in Brazil, the largest country, are
just 4%. I find, as Eaton and Kortum (2002), that the gains from reducing trade costs are larger
than the losses of going to autarky. Thus, just by reducing trade barriers South America can
obtain large gains.
To assess the potential gains South American countries may obtain from the interaction of trade
and MP, in addition to the reduction in trade costs I increase the productivity of multinational
26Trade barriers can be reduced by reducing trade tariffs within the region and also with the RW, improving
the available infrastructures, forcing countries to respect trade agreements, etc.
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firms by 20%. Panel B of Table 1.9 presents the results of this experiment. There is a large
gain in real manufacturing GDP in all countries, but specially in large countries. However, since
multinational firms send their profits back, the increase is not reflected in a large increase in real
manufacturing GNP, except for Uruguay. In Uruguay, real manufacturing GDP increases more
than 9 percentage points relative to the previous experiment, while real manufacturing GNP
increases almost 7 percentage points more relative to the previous experiment.
Panel C of Table 1.9 presents the result of only increasing the efficiency to multinationals op-
erating in Uruguay by the same magnitude as in the previous exercise. Changes in real manu-
facturing GDP for the rest of countries are the same as in the case of only reducing trade costs,
while in Uruguay it increases by 12 percentage points in addition. An interesting result from
these experiments is that Uruguay would gain more if the efficiency improves only domestically
compared to the case where it improves in all the countries of the region. This is because if the
efficiency only improves in Uruguay there is a larger set of multinationals going to this country.
Discussion on Bridge Multinational Production
The previous experiments reflect the importance of BMP for a small country. In the absence of
BMP, the gains in real manufacturing GDP of reducing trade barriers decrease for all countries,
but they decrease significantly more for Uruguay. In Uruguay the gains are reduced by 6.2 p.p.
while in Brazil they are only reduced in 0.3 p.p. (see Panel A of Table 1.9, column 3). When
trade costs are reduced, small countries can attract more foreign firms who will locate there to
export to the rest of countries, explaining the importance of BMP. This indicates that, for small
countries like Uruguay to take advantage of MP, it needs to be able to export to the rest of
countries in the region.
Panel B of Table 1.9 shows in the third column the increase in manufacturing real GDP when
in addition to the reduction in trade costs we increase efficiency of foreign firms but we do not
allow for BMP. Compared to the numbers in Panel A we see that Uruguay is the country with
the smallest additional increase in manufacturing real GDP (0.7 p.p.) while the rest of countries
show increases that goes from 1.9 p.p. to 4 p.p. This result indicates that BMP is crucial for
Uruguay to benefit from increases in efficiency of multinationals since otherwise the gains would
not be larger than the ones it would get by only reducing trade costs.
Finally, if we only improved the efficiency of foreign firms operating in Uruguay we again find
that BMP is crucial to explain the gains. While in the baseline economy real manufacturing
GDP increases 10.9 p.p. more than when we only reduce trade costs, if we shut down BMP the
additional increase is only of 2.3 p.p. The result is explained because without the possibility of
serving third countries Uruguay does not become an attractive location for multinational firms,
even with the increase in productivity, because its domestic market is small.
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Discussion on the Role of Assumption 1
Assumption 1 allows me to treat each activity as independent. With assumption 1 a firm lo-
cated in Uruguay and exporting to Brazil is going to produce a different good than a firm that
decided to locate in Brazil to sell in Brazil. Using the fact that activities are independent, I
can calculate profits for each activity separately which simplifies the solution of the problem.
Without assumption 1 a firm would have to choose from which location to serve each market.
With assumption 1 a firm can serve one market from all the locations. Then, assumption 1
reduces the degree of competition between countries to attract MP. The decrease in competition
also reduces the importance of the efficiency of multinationals operating in my country. Without
assumption 1, a firm will choose to locate in the country that is more efficient, and the rest of
countries will not be able to attract this firm (as long as trade costs are low enough). Now, all
countries may attract MP as long as the activity is profitable for a firm. Then the gains I ob-
tained from reducing trade barriers and improving efficiency will be higher without assumption
1 for the most efficient country (the one that will be able able to attract larger amounts of MP).
The importance of assumption 1 is closely link to the role played by BMP. Without assumption
1, BMP would be crucial for the most efficient market to be able to attract MP, specially if
the most efficient country is small, since what the firm wants is to serve all countries from the
cheapest location (and as opening plants in other countries involve paying a fixed cost, firms may
want to minimize the number of locations). The small country, even though is efficient is not
going to attract MP since the domestic market is small. Then, BMP becomes a very important
factor without assumption 1. Then, my results are a lower bound for the importance of BMP.
The importance of BMP for a small country in the open region, like the Netherlands, might
be underestimated if the country is used as an export platform to serve the rest of European
countries. Also the differences between how much BMP contributes to the gains from openness
between Uruguay and the Netherlands (the small countries in each region) will be enhance with-
out assumption 1.
To sum up, assumption 1 simplifies the solution of the problem by making each activity indepen-
dent. Assumption 1 decreases the competition between countries to attract MP which reduces
the importance of the efficiency of multinationals operating in the domestic country. Finally,
even though with assumption 1 BMP is an important factor, without assumption 1 BMP will
be crucial for attracting MP, specially for small countries.
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1.5.3 Firm size distribution
There is a large literature studying the effects of different kind of frictions on the size distribution
of firms. Previous studies have focused on the effects of size dependent policies (Guner, Ventura,
and Xu (2008), Restuccia and Rogerson (2008), Garc´ıa-Santana and Pijoan-Mas (2012)), capital
market imperfections (Erosa (2001), Amaral and Quintin (2010), Buera, Kaboski, and Shin
(2011), Greenwood, Sanchez, and Wang (2010)) and trade (Melitz (2003), Piguillem and Rubini
(2012)) on firm size distribution. I contribute to these literature by assessing the effect of trade
and MP on the distribution of firms’ sizes and show that these effects vary across small and large
countries within a region, and also among countries of similar size across regions with different
degree of openness.
Let first study the total effect of trade and MP in the distribution of firm size. In autarky
all countries will have the same distribution of firms,27 while in the baseline economy this
distribution differs significantly across countries. In the baseline economy, the small country in
each region has a higher proportion of large firms than the large country. In South America,
Uruguay has 1.1% of firms with more than 250 employees while Brazil has 0.8%, and in Europe
this proportion is 4.2% for the Netherlands and 1.7% for Italy. It can also be observed that
trade and MP has a larger impact on the size distribution of firms for countries in Europe (the
open region) than for countries in South America (the closed region). The proportion of firms
with more than 250 employees is almost four times larger in the Netherlands than in Uruguay
(4.4% vs 1.1%), and in Italy it doubles that from Brazil (1.7% vs 0.8%). As Europe is more
open, they benefit more from trade and MP and these shape the distribution of firms increasing
the proportion of large firms.
To disentangle the role played by trade and MP in shaping the size distribution of firms, I
compute the distribution of firm sizes in a world without MP. Comparing the result of the
column No MP to autarky we obtain the contribution of trade to the size distribution of firms,
and comparing the result of the column named baseline to the one named No MP we obtain the
contribution of MP.
For large countries, MP seems to be the most important factor. While the proportion of large
firms is almost unchanged when allowing for trade compared to autarky, it increases significantly
when we allow for MP. In Italy from the 1 percentage point increase explained by openness, 0.2
p.p. is explained by trade while 0.8 p.p. is explained by MP. For small countries this is not true.
Both trade and MP have similar effects. In Uruguay allowing for trade increases the proportion
of large firms 0.2 p.p. and allowing for MP increases the proportion 0.2 p.p. In the Netherlands,
trade increases the proportion of large firms by 1.3 p.p. and MP by 2.2 p.p.
27This comes from the fact that I am using a Pareto distribution with the same shape parameter for the
productivity of firms
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To sum up, trade and MP have important effects on the size distribution of firms, but this effect
varies across countries and regions. Openness has a larger effect in the size distribution of firms
on countries in the open region and in small countries compared to large countries.
1.6 Conclusions
In this paper I construct a heterogeneous firms model of trade with asymmetric countries, MP,
and BMP to study the effects of trade barriers and country size in the location decision of
multinational firms. I find that BMP is crucial for a small country to attract MP and to take
full advantage from trade liberalization and efficiency improvements. BMP explains up to 20%
of the gains from openness in the Netherlands while only 10% in Uruguay.
If trade costs are reduced in South America to the average level in Europe, Uruguay’s real
manufacturing GDP increases 30%. If I do not allow for BMP this increase is reduced by
6 percentage points. If in addition we improve the efficiency of multinationals operating in
Uruguay by 20%, real manufacturing GDP increases 41.8%. However, almost all the additional
increase in manufacturing real GDP is explained by BMP, since without BMP the increase is
26%, only 2.3 p.p. larger than without any improvement in the efficiency of multinationals.
Finally, MP and BMP shift the distribution of firms toward large firms reinforcing the effect of
trade. While in autarky the Netherlands and Uruguay have the same distribution of firms, in
the calibrated version of the model, the Netherlands have a proportion of firms with more than
100 employees which doubles that of Uruguay, and with more than 250 employees which is four
times larger.
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Table 1.1: Calibrated Parameters
Panel A
Li κe κd κx κMP z
Argentina 9.47 0.09 1.67 0.34 11.77 0.13
Brazil 48.94 1.95 1.67 1.15 2.07 0.35
Chile 3.69 0.13 1.67 2.05 19.07 0.04
Uruguay 1.00 0.07 1.67 0.82 9.17 0.01
Rest of the World 1582.5 3.00 1.67 1.00 2.67 12.66
Panel B
Li κe κd κx κMP z
France 16.8 3.3e-6 1.67 0.89 5.42 0.78
United Kingdom 18.7 3.0e-6 1.67 1.50 10.07 0.90
Italy 14.9 1.0e-6 1.67 1.25 9.87 0.73
Netherlands 4.9 1.0e-6 1.67 3.32 10.97 0.25
Rest of the World 1567.3 1.00 1.67 1.00 2.67 15.67
Table 1.2: Calibration Results-Iceberg Export Costs
Panel A
Exporting country
Country Argentina Brazil Chile Uruguay RW
Argentina 1 2.27 2.73 2.39 2.61
Brazil 1.48 1 2.36 1.76 2.03
Chile 1.66 2.07 1 2.27 1.93
Uruguay 1.75 2.19 2.57 1 2.68
Rest of the World 1.74 1.97 2.06 2.22 1
Panel B
Exporting country
Country France UK Italy Netherlands RW
France 1 1.82 1.62 1.74 1.61
UK 1.59 1 1.70 1.50 1.36
Italy 1.80 1.94 1 1.74 1.81
Netherlands 1.52 1.49 1.55 1 1.32
Rest of the World 1.81 1.80 1.78 1.77 1
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Table 1.3: Calibration Results-Efficiency of Multinational Firms
Country of origin
Panel A
Country Argentina Brazil Chile Uruguay RW
Argentina 1 1.47 1.46 1.41 1.48
Brazil 3.75 1 3.08 2.45 2.49
Chile 2.49 2.35 1 2.15 1.81
Uruguay 100 100 100 1 2.02
Panel B
Country of origin
Country France UK Italy Netherlands RW
France 1 1.62 2.15 1.83 0.33
UK 1.65 1 2.20 1.68 0.28
Italy 1.40 1.49 1 1.55 0.29
Netherlands 1.65 1.47 100 1 0.29
Table 1.4: Performance of the Model-Trade Composition
Trade (as % of Absorption)-Data vs Model
Panel A
Arg Bra Chi Uru RW
Data Model D M D M D M D M
Arg - - 2.9 3.3 3.5 3.8 9.5 9.8 0.2 0.2
Bra 9.6 9.1 - - 4.2 4.4 17.2 16.8 0.5 0.5
Chi 1.5 1.1 0.5 0.4 - - 1.8 1.5 0.2 0.1
Uru 0.8 0.9 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5 - - 0.0 0.0
RW 24.0 24.2 18.9 18.9 51.3 51.5 29.9 30.1 - -
Total 35.8 35.1 22.8 23.2 59.4 60.1 58.3 58.2 0.9 0.9
Panel B
Fra UK Ita Neth RW
Data Model D M D M D M D M
Fra - - 8.5 6.3 8.6 7.5 13.8 11.2 2.3 1.7
UK 6.7 7.2 - - 4.4 5.1 18.6 18.9 2.6 2.8
Ita 7.6 7.2 5.0 4.3 - - 9.7 10.8 1.7 1.3
Neth 3.4 3.6 5.8 5.3 2.7 3.6 - - 1.2 1.2
RW 34.2 34.7 49.5 49.7 28.4 28.0 76.2 77.2 - -
Total 51.9 52.7 68.9 65.6 44.1 44.2 118.4 118.1 7.7 7.1
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Table 1.5: Performance of the Model-Foreign Production Composition
Foreign Sales (as % of Total Sales)-Data vs Model
Panel A
Argentina Brazil Chile Uruguay
Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model
Argentina - - 0.1% 0.1% 0.7% 0.6% 0.0% 0%
Brazil 1.4% 1.5% - - 0.3% 0.3% 0.0% 0%
Chile 1.4% 1.4% 0.1% 0.1% - - 0.0% 0%
Uruguay 1.1% 1.0% 0.2% 0.2 % 0.3% 0.3% - -
RW 31.9% 31.7% 7.8% 8.0% 32.5% 32.3% 29.7% 30.7%
Panel B
Fra UK Ita Neth
Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model
France - - 2.5% 2.1% 2.5 % 2.6% 2.9% 2.6%
UK 3.0% 3.4% - - 1.6% 1.9% 4.9% 5.3%
Italy 1.6% 2.1% 1.2% 1.3% - - 0.0% 0.0%
Netherlands 1.4% 1.4% 2.1 % 1.6 % 1.3% 1.2 - -
RW 20.1% 20.3% 38.9% 37.8% 13.2% 12.7% 35.0% 35.1%
Table 1.6: Calibration Results: Aggregate Targets
Panel A
Data vs Model
% Exporting Firms % Foreign Firms GDP per Capita Trade Balance
Data Model D M D M D M
Arg 52.3 52.4 7.9 7.9 1.56 1.56 -6.0 -6.1
Bra 14.1 14.1 7.2 6.9 0.87 0.86 -1.5 -1.8
Chi 24.6 24.3 5.8 5.8 1.08 1.08 -8.9 -8.8
Uru 33.3 32.8 7.7 8.0 1.22 1.24 -10.1 -9.9
Panel B
Data vs Model
% Exporting Firms % Foreign Firms GDP per Capita Trade Balance
Data Model D M D M D M
Fra 44.7 45.0 11.5 11.7 4.7 4.6 0.7 0.7
UK 37.0 36.7 12.6 12.8 4.6 4.6 -2.2 -2.4
Ita 28.4 28.9 3.6 3.9 5.5 5.5 8.9 9.5
Neth 42.2 42.5 12.9 12.5 5.0 5.0 -1.8 -1.6
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Table 1.7: Experiment Results-Closing the Economies
Panel A
Changes in %
Autarky with BMP Autarky without BMP
Real GDP Real GNP Real GDP Real GNP
South-America -5.3 -3.4 -5.0 -3.5
Argentina -9.5 -4.9 -9.0 -5.2
Brazil -3.6 -2.5 -3.5 -2.5
Chile -11.9 -8.7 -10.9 -8.9
Uruguay -12.1 -10.8 -10.9 -10.4
Panel B
Changes in %
Autarky with BMP Autarky without BMP
Real GDP Real GNP Real GDP Real GNP
Europe -10.5 -7.3 -9.3 -7.3
France -9.1 -6.4 -8.3 -6.3
UK -13.4 -8.8 -11.9 -9.0
Italy -5.6 -3.5 -5.1 -3.6
Netherlands -20.3 -17.1 -17.0 -16.5
Table 1.8: Experiment Results-The Effects of MP and BMP
Panel A
Relative losses in real GDP
Baseline
World without BMP
World without BMP
World without MP
Baseline
World without MP
Argentina 1.055 2.033 2.145
Brazil 1.035 1.510 1.563
Chile 1.099 1.478 1.623
Uruguay 1.112 1.510 1.680
Panel B
Relative losses in real GDP
Baseline
World without BMP
World without BMP
World without MP
Baseline
World without MP
France 1.087 1.679 1.826
UK 1.128 1.671 1.885
Italy 1.097 1.841 2.019
Netherlands 1.199 1.203 1.443
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Table 1.9: Experiment Results-Reducing Costs
Panel A
Changes (in %)
Same MP costs Same MP Costs-No BMP
Real GDP Real GNP Real GDP Real GNP
South-America 6.2 6.1 5.3 6.0
Argentina 11.2 11.1 9.0 11.7
Brazil 4.0 4.0 3.7 4.0
Chile 13.1 12.4 9.4 12.4
Uruguay 29.9 29.1 23.7 27.1
Panel B
Changes (in %)
Improve 20% efficiency Improve 20% efficiency- No BMP
Real GDP Real GNP Real GDP Real GNP
South-America 9.7 6.6 7.6 6.9
Argentina 17.7 11.7 13.0 13.0
Brazil 6.3 4.3 5.6 4.5
Chile 21.4 14.3 12.4 14.3
Uruguay 38.3 36.6 24.4 30.7
Panel C
Changes (in %)
Improve 20% efficiency Improve 20% efficiency
only in Uruguay only in Uruguay- No BMP
Real GDP Real GNP Real GDP Real GNP
South-America 6.3 6.1 5.3 6.2
Argentina 11.1 11.1 9.0 11.7
Brazil 4.0 4.0 3.7 4.0
Chile 13.1 12.4 9.4 12.4
Uruguay 41.8 29.3 26.0 28.1
For all the experiments I use the average trade costs in Europe (τ = 1.64)
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Table 1.10: Experiment Results-Firms Size Distribution
Panel A
Proportion of firms with more than x employees
Benchmark No BMP No MP Autarky
> 100 > 250 > 100 > 250 > 100 > 250 > 100 > 250
Uruguay 3.4 1.1 3.2 1.0 2.9 0.9 2.2 0.7
Netherlands 7.9 4.2 7.5 3.7 5.6 2.0 2.2 0.7
Panel B
Proportion of firms with more than x employees
Benchmark No BMP No MP Autarky
> 100 > 250 > 100 > 250 > 100 > 250 > 100 > 250
Brazil 2.4 0.8 2.3 0.8 2.4 0.8 2.2 0.7
Italy 3.5 1.7 3.5 1.6 2.8 0.9 2.2 0.7
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Figure 1.1: Correlation TradeGDP and Size
Source: Author’s elaboration based on UNCTAD data for 2012
Figure 1.2: Correlation FDIStockGDP and Size
Source: Author’s elaboration based on UNCTAD data for 2012
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Figure 1.3: Average iceberg trade costs
Chapter 2
Financial Frictions, Occupational
Choice and Economic Inequality
2.1 Introduction
A recent literature has emphasized that the misallocation of resources caused by financial fric-
tions depress total factor productivity and, hence, output per worker (Erosa (2001), Jeong and
Townsend (2007), Amaral and Quintin (2010), Buera and Shin (2011), Buera, Kaboski, and
Shin (2011), Greenwood, Sanchez, and Wang (2010)). The standard approach in the financial
frictions literature and, more generally in the misallocation literature (see Guner, Ventura, and
Xu (2008), and Restuccia and Rogerson (2008)) is to calibrate the model to micro data from the
United States and use the calibrated model economy to simulate policy distortions in developing
countries.1 While this approach has the advantage that the US data is readily available, it re-
lies on the assumption that the distribution of entrepreneurial skills or plant productivities are
invariant across countries or, at the very least, do not matter for the misallocation of resources
induced by policy distortions or limited enforcement in the financial markets. However, there is
ample evidence suggesting that the distribution of skills do vary across rich and poor countries.2
Moreover, economic theory suggests that inequality matters for the impact of micro distortions
and financial frictions (see Banerjee and Newman (1993), Galor and Zeira (1993)).
We develop a quantitative theory of entrepreneurship, income inequality, and financial frictions
disciplined with household level data from Brazil. The theory is used to quantitatively evaluate
the impact of financial frictions on occupational decisions, resource allocation, aggregate output,
and economic inequality. Conversely, we study how economic inequality shapes the impact of
1Notable exceptions are given by Midrigan and Xu (2014) and Garc´ıa-Santana and Pijoan-Mas (2012)
2In fact, even among developed economies, recent work on international trade theory argues that the hetero-
geneity in the (second moments of the ) skill distribution plays an important role for understanding trade patterns
among similarly endowed economies (see Ohnsorge and Trefler (2007) and references in that paper).
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financial frictions in the economy. Our paper contributes to a seminal (mostly theoretical)
literature that has emphasized the importance of the interaction between the distribution of
wealth and financial frictions for the allocation of resources. Moreover, we use our theory of
inequality to quantitatively assess the distribution of welfare gains and losses from eliminating
financial frictions in the economy.
The key innovation of our theory is to extend the Lucas (1978) model in order to incorporate
heterogeneity in two skills: −working and managerial skills. By modeling heterogeneity in two
skills the theory can distinguish between comparative advantage in entrepreneurship (a high
ratio of managerial to working skills) and absolute advantage (a high value of both skills). This
distinction is necessary for the theory to be consistent with evidence on the income distribution
across occupations in Brazil. In particular, the ratio of median earnings between entrepreneurs
and workers in Brazil is equal to one, which implies that the median entrepreneur in the Brazilian
data does not make higher earnings than the median worker. This implication is grossly at odds
with the predominant one-skill model developed in the occupational choice literature.
By assuming that entrepreneurs can use their working and managerial skills in the operation of
their businesses, our theory has the novel implication that some entrepreneurs will not hire any
outside labor and be own account workers (or self-employed entrepreneurs). Building a theory
that distinguishes between entrepreneurs that are employers and those that are self-employed is
important because there is abundant evidence that the high rates of entrepreneurship in poor
countries is mostly due to the prevalence of self-employed workers (see Figure 2.2). In fact, the
high rates of self-employment is an important feature of the Brazilian data and, our findings,
imply that self-employment is important for understanding the impact of financial frictions in
Brazil.
We assume a small open economy that takes as given the international interest rate. Following
Buera, Kaboski, and Shin (2011), capital market imperfections are introduced by modeling an
endogenous borrowing constraint that limits the amount of capital that entrepreneurs can use.
We prove that in the absence of financial frictions occupational choices are driven entirely by
the ratio of managerial to working skills. Employers have a comparative advantage at managing
(high zmzw ), workers have a comparative advantage at working (low
zm
zw
), and self-employed have
an intermediate skill ratio. Heterogeneity in absolute advantage implies that both at the top
and bottom of the income distribution there are entrepreneurs and workers. We characterize
how capital market imperfections distort rates of returns on skills by making the return to
managerial and working skills depend on asset holdings. We show that financial frictions have a
non-trivial impact on inequality: On the one hand, they lead to higher and persistent inequality
by generating variation in returns to skills and by making these returns depend on asset holdings.
On the other hand, since borrowing constraints tend to be tighter for highly skill than for low
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skill individuals, financial frictions reduce inequality by diminshing the rents obtained by highly
skilled individuals relative to a situation with perfect capital markets.
The model economy is calibrated to Brazilian household data and macro aggregates. Brazil
provides a nice benchmark because it is a country that exhibits both high levels of economic
inequality and of financial frictions. We simulate the effects of removing financial frictions in
the calibrated model economy. We find a large drop in the rates of entrepreneurship (from 33%
to 18%), which is mostly due to a decrease in self-employment. While the self-employment rate
decreases from 24% to 11%, the fraction of employers only drops by about 2 percentage points.
The gain in aggregate output amounts to 48%. There are also sizable changes in the sectorial
composition of output. Production by employers increase by 64% whereas production of the
self-employed decreases by 53%. TFP in the economy increased by 24%, with this gain being
larger than the TFP gain among self-employed (9%) and that among employers (16%). The
share of aggregate capital used by the self-employed drops from 19% to 4%. Because employers
tend to have a higher managerial ability than self-employed entrepreneurs, the reallocation of
capital between these two groups enhances the aggregate productivity gains of removing financial
frictions.
We also simulate the impact of removing financial frictions when self-employment is shut down
in the baseline economy. We find that the output gain is 53%, which is higher than the 48%
increase obtained in the baseline economy. Hence, self-employment decreases the negative impact
of financial frictions on aggregate output. This finding can be explained as follows: Financial
frictions make it hard for young and talented entrepreneurs (individuals with high managerial
skills) to raise external funds. This effect is compounded by the fact that financial frictions
depress the equilibrium real wage, which makes it difficult to accumulate savings by working for
a paid wage when young. Self-employment allows talented entrepreneurs to circumvent the low
wage and build up savings, diminishing the negative impact of financial frictions on aggregate
output. Hence, our findings implies that self-employment diminishes the impact of financial
frictions by being a pathway towards becoming an employer. The occupational transitions in
the Brazilian household data support this prediction of the theory: Self-employed individuals
are three times more likely to become employers than paid workers and about 40% of transitions
into employer between two consecutive years are coming directly from self-employment. Our
baseline economy matches these facts remarkably closely.
Financial frictions have important effects on the sources of income inequality and on its persis-
tence over time. We divide household income between capital income and labor income, with
labor income defined as the sum of the returns to working and managerial skill inputs. Surpris-
ingly, we find that capital market imperfections have opposing effects on the concentration of
labor income and capital income. Labor income is more evenly distributed in the economy with
imperfect capital markets than in the economy with no financial frictions (with a Gini index of
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.52 versus a Gini index .56 in the latter economy). This is because financial frictions depress the
rents earn by highly able entrepreneurs relative to an economy with perfect capital markets .
On the other hand, the Gini index of capital income is about 10 percentage points higher in the
economy with imperfect credit markets. Financial frictions imply that the returns to managerial
ability are positively correlated with capital income. The correlation between capital and labor
income is equal to 0.80 in the baseline economy, which is much larger than the 0.50 value in the
economy with perfect capital markets. This effect explains why income inequality is also more
persistent in the economy with financial frictions.
The skill distribution matters importantly for the impact of financial frictions. This is shown by
recalibrating two new economies in which the correlation between working and managerial skills
is set exogenously to a high (0.8) and a low (-0.8) value (the calibration of the baseline economy
implies a skill correlation of 0.1). We find that the output and TFP gains of improving credit
market institutions are large in all economies but vary substantially across the three calibrated
model economies. The output gains range from 36% to 55% and the TFP gains range from 22%
to 31% as the correlation between skills decreases. The skill correlation determines the extent
to which talented entrepreneurs are able to self-finance their businesses. When the correlation
between these two skills is high, individuals that are talented as entrepreneurs are also talented
as workers. Then, if skills are also persistent over time, young and talented individuals can work
when young, build savings, and use their savings to finance their businesses when old. Thus,
when managerial and working skills are highly correlated and persistent over time, the effects of
financial frictions on resource allocations are less important than otherwise.
Given that financial frictions are so detrimental for the efficient allocation of productive resources
and aggregate output, one question that rises is why countries set up institutions causing financial
frictions and why these institutions are so persistent. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) provided
many historical accounts of how political power determines economic institutions and, in turn,
how political power is shaped by the political institutions and the distribution of resources in
society. Given that our theory of inequality was calibrated to Brazilian household data we can
gain some insights into the political economy of capital market imperfections by studying the
welfare gains and losses of reforming capital markets in our calibrated model economy. We
assume that the economy is in steady state and that suddenly there is a once and for all reform
that makes the enforcement of credit contracts perfect. We find that the financial reform has
non-trivial effects on the distribution of income and that occupational choices are crucial for
understanding how the reform impacts on individuals. Keeping fixed the occupational choices of
the initial steady state, workers gain with the reform since the wage rate increase. Self-employed
also gain since they can borrow more. Unconstrained employers loose since wage payments go up
but their managerial rents do not increase. Constrained employers may gain or loose depending
on whether the increase in managerial rents outweighs the increase in wages. Since the increase
in managerial rents is likely to be more important for talented entrepreneurs, these entrepreneurs
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are more likely to see their income increase. The untalented entrepreneurs who were operating
businesses prior to the reform are likely to see their income go down and to switch occupations.
We find that while the vast majority of households gain from the reform, about 8.7% of the
population see their welfare decrease with the reform. Households that lose from the reform tend
to be older, richer, and exhibit higher managerial skills and lower working skills than households
that support the reform. These findings are just reflecting that occupational choices are crucial
for understanding the political economy of the reform: Among the households that are worse off
with the reform, about 93% of them would have been entrepreneurs on the period of the reform
had the reform not taken place, and 66% would have been employers. Employers are a positive
selection from the population distribution of managerial skills. Then, the fact that about two
thirds of those who oppose the reform are employers explains why the managerial ability of
those supporting the reform is higher than that of those opposing the reform. Nonetheless, not
all employers support the reform: About 36% of employers in the initial equilibrium benefit
from the elimination of enforcement problems. We find that the employers benefiting from the
reform tend to be of higher managerial ability than those who oppose it. The reason is that high
ability employers are more likely to be borrowing constrained than low ability entrepreneurs.
As a result, they are more likely to operate at an inefficient scale and to gain more from the
elimination of enforcement problems. On the other hand, the financial reform hurts many of
the lower skill employers and force them to change their occupation status: About 46% of the
entrepreneurs that oppose to the reform and would have been employers had the reform not
taken place, do not hire any labor after the reform (most of them become self-employed after
the reform). The wage hike after the reform makes it unprofitable for these entrepreneurs to
hire outside labor.
Summing up, while most households benefits from a reform that eliminates enforcement prob-
lems, the majority of employers (about two thirds) lose from the reform. By depressing the
demand for labor, limited enforcement depresses the equilibrium wage rate, increasing the prof-
its of employers. Our theory thus suggests that employers may have a vested interested in
maintaining a status quo with low enforcement.
The paper continues as follows. Section 2 presents some facts on entrepreneurship and economic
inequality in Brazil. Section 3 presents the model economy. Section 4 presents some analytical
results characterizing how financial frictions affects occupational choice decisions, rates of returns
to skills, and inequality. Section 5 calibrates the model economy, evaluates the performance of
the model economy, and assesses the effects of removing financial frictions on occupational
choices, aggregate output, and income inequality. This section also discusses how changes in the
correlation of skills affect the impact of financial frictions on aggregate output. The paper ends
with a discussion of the political economy of removing financial frictions in Brazil.
Chapter 2. Financial Frictions, Occupational Choice and Economic Inequality 45
2.2 Evidence
We now document some facts on occupations and economic inequality in Brazil that guide the
theory developed in this paper. The facts are based on data from the Pesquisa Mensal de
Emprego (PME) and from the Pesquisa de Ornamentos Familiares (POF). The former is a
monthly household employment survey, with a similar structure to the US Current Population
Survey (CPS). The latter is a survey of household consumption and income. Appendix A
describes how the data set used in this paper was constructed.
Income inequality Figure 2.1 presents data on the variance of log-income over the life cycle
from the PME (similar findings arise from the POF). First, note that the variance of log-income
at age 20 is 0.55, which is much higher than the value of 0.30 documented by Storesletten, Telmer,
and Yaron (2005) for the United States. Thus, households in Brazil are quite heterogeneous at
young ages. As in the United States, inequality in income grows during the life cycle suggesting
the presence of persistent shocks to household earnings. By age 55, household log-income reaches
a value of 1.01.
Occupational structure We define the occupation of a household as that of the household
head. We consider two broad occupations − workers and entrepreneurs. Moreover, we further
subdivide the entrepreneurial occupation in two classes − employers and own account workers
(self-employed). Figure 2.2 uses data from the ILO to analyze occupational structure in different
countries. The blue bar on Figure 2.2 shows the proportion of workers, the orange bar the
proportion of self-employed, and the green bar the proportion of employers.3 The evidence
shows that developed countries have lower amount of entrepreneurs than developing countries,
but this data pattern is driven by the lower proportion of self-employed in developed countries.
The proportion of employers in the population of households is quite similar among countries.
While in Brazil workers represent about 73% of households, in Germany they are about 89%. The
high proportion of entrepreneurial households in Brazil is explained by self-employed households
which represent about 22% of the labour force in Brazil, much lower than the 6% of self-employed
households in Germany. The fraction of employers is roughly equal across these two countries
(about 5%). Employers and self-employed are quite different in their average income: On average
employers earn about 3 times as much as self-employed households. Moreover, self-employed earn
less than the average worker.
Distribution of earnings by occupation We show two graphs on the distribution of
earnings by occupation: The first one shows the distribution of earnings for workers and
3For Canada and the United States, the ILO does not distinguish between self-employed and employers so that
the orange bar is the sum of the two.
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entrepreneurs, the second one shows the earnings for entrepreneurs partitioned between self-
employed and employers. Figure 2.3 shows that the distribution of earnings of entrepreneurs is
flatter than the one of workers, having a bigger mass of people with low earnings but also a bigger
mass of households with high earnings. Thus, earnings are more dispersed among entrepreneurs
than workers. If we further divide the Entrepreneurs in Self-Employed and Employers we can
see that the first group is the one that has more mass in the lower tail of earnings. Figure 2.4
shows that Self-Employment is the occupation with the lowest expected returns, while Employer
is the one with the highest expected returns.
Summarizing, we draw the following lessons from the above facts:
1. Income inequality in Brazil is high relative to the US, which underscores the importance of
calibrating the model to Brazilian micro data. Brazilian households are highly heteroge-
neous early in the life cycle and inequality grows substantially with age. These observations
suggests the importance of modeling heterogeneity in fixed effects (permanent skill hetero-
geneity) as well as persistent shocks to skills.
2. The fact that both wages and entrepreneurial income are highly dispersed, motivates us
to build a model with two dimensional skill heterogeneity.
3. It is important to build a theory that distinguishes between employers and self-employed
entrepreneurs since most entrepreneurial households in Brazil are self-employed (or own-
account workers) households and distribution of income differ substantially across both
categories of entrepreneurs. While mean income of employers is much higher than that of
self-employed households, there is substantial income heterogeneity within each of these
occupational categories.
4. The variation in the rates of entrepreneurship between Brazil and rich countries is entirely
explained by the high rates of self-employment in Brazil, a fact that existing theories of
occupational choice cannot account for.
2.3 The Model
We consider a small open economy in steady state. The model features a one sector life-cycle
growth model in which households are heterogeneous in two skills − working (zw) and managerial
abilities (zm). Skills evolve stochastically over the life cycle and there are no insurance markets
to insure ability risk. Production is organized by entrepreneurs who combine managerial, capital,
and labor inputs. As in Lucas (1978), entrepreneurs can only use their own managerial skills
since there is no markets for managers. In each period households choose their occupation:
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whether to work for a wage or to operate a business and become entrepreneurs. Occupational
choices are based on their comparative advantage as entrepreneurs and their access to capital.
Following Buera, Kaboski, and Shin (2011), access to capital is limited by their wealth through
an endogenous collateral constraint that arises because of enforcement problems. In order to
match important aspects of the Brazilian micro data, the Lucas (1978) model is extended to
distinguish between two types of entrepreneurial households − employers and self-employed
households.
Population The economy is populated by overlapping generations, each generation consisting
of a continuum of households. Households are born at age 20, retire at age 60, and die with
certainty at age 75. Each households is endowed with one unit of time at every age. Before
the retirement age, households decide how much of their time to allocate to working (tw) or to
managerial (tm) activities. Households differ in working (zw) and managerial (zm) abilities. The
logarithm of skills evolve stochastically over the life cycle according to (household i at age t)
ln(zwit) = βwXt + αwi + uwit,
ln(zmit) = βmXt + αmi + umit,
where zwit (zmit )denote the working (managerial) skills of household i at age t, Xt represents
a quartic polynomio of age, αwi and αmi represent household fixed effects on working and
managerial productivities, and uwit and umit are life cycle shocks received at age t by household
i. We assume that the fixed effects are drawn from a bi-variate normal distribution at the first
period of life of the household (age 20):
α = (αwi,αmi) ∼ N
￿￿
0
0
￿
,
￿
σ2w ρσwσm
ρσwσm σ2m
￿￿
where ρ is the correlation between the two fixed effects across individuals. The mean fixed effect
of the distribution of working skills is normalized to 0.
The life-cycle shocks follow the stochastic process
ujit = ρjujit−1 + ￿jit, for j = w,m,
with ￿t = (￿wt, ￿mt) jointly drawn from a bivariate normal distribution with correlation coefficient
corr(￿wt, ￿mt) = ρ. We further assume that αji and ujit are mutually orthogonal.
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The assumptions made imply that distribution of skills at age-t is log-normally distributed￿
ln(zwt)
ln(zmt)
￿
∼ N
￿￿
0
0
￿
,
￿
σ2wt ρwmtσwtσmt
ρwmtσwtσmt σ2mt
￿￿
σ2wt = σ
2
αw +
t−1￿
j=0
(ρjw)
2σ2￿w
σ2mt = σ
2
αm +
t−1￿
j=0
(ρjm)
2σ2￿m
ρwmtσwtσmt = cov(αw,αm) +
t−1￿
j=0
ρjwρ
j
mcov(￿w, ￿m)
cov(αw,αm) = ρσαwσαm
cov(￿w, ￿m) = ρσ￿wσ￿m
Production technology Following Lucas (1978), output is produced with a constant returns
to scale production technology in managerial, labor, and capital inputs. Entrepreneurs can only
use their managerial input because there is no market for managers. The supply of the managerial
input is equal to the product of the households’ managerial ability (zm) and the time devoted
to managing a business (tm). The output produced by a household supplying m = zmtm units
of managerial input and using k units of capital and n efficiency units of labor is:
Y (m, k, n) = mγkνnθ, where γ + ν + θ = 1. (2.1)
The time allocation decision of entrepreneurs (tm ∈ [0, 1]) is modeled to introduced self-employment
in the Lucas (1978) framework. When 0 < tm < 1 entrepreneurs supply both managerial and
labor inputs to their own businesses. Specifically, the labor input supplied by entrepreneurs
to their business is equal to the product of their working ability (zw) and the time devoted to
non-managerial activities (1− tm). The total labor input used by an entrepreneur is the sum of
the labor supplied by the entrepreneur ((1− tm)zw) and the labor hired in the market (nd) from
workers outside the family:
n = nd + (1− tm)zw, (2.2)
where zw is the working ability of the household. We denote as entrepreneurs the households
that choose tm > 0. Entrepreneurs, in turn, are partitioned in two subgroups depending on
whether they hire outside labor or not. The first subgroup is given by the employers, who are
those entrepreneurs hiring labor outside the family (nd > 0) . We assume that entrepreneurs
that hire outside labor incur a fixed per period operating cost of cf .4 The second subgroup are
4The fixed cost is introduced so that employers demand a non-trivial amount of labor (an amount bounded
away from zero), thereby making the distinction between self-employed and employer meaningful.
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those entrepreneurs that only use their own household labor input (n = (1− tm)zw and nd = 0).
Workers are those households who use all their available time as workers (tm = 0, obtaining
labor earnings wzw).
Summarizing, entrepreneurs produce output with a production technology that combines capi-
tal, labor, and managerial inputs. The key distinguishing feature between employers and self-
employed is that the latter do not hire labor outside the household and that employers pay
a fixed cost in each period of business operation. They both solve a time-allocation problem
regarding the fraction of their time endowment used to supply managerial versus working skills.
Below, we shall characterize how entrepreneurs optimally choose the time (tm) dedicated to the
supply of managerial skills.
Capital markets We assume that the financial intermediation industry is competitive. In-
termediaries take deposits from households and pay the international interest rate r. They
rent capital to entrepreneurs at a rate r + δ and loan employers the fixed cost of operation cf .
Enforcement problems limit the amount of borrowing and the capital rented to entrepreneurs.
Following Buera, Kaboski, and Shin (2011), entrepreneurs may renege on the contracts after
production has taken place and keep a fraction 1− φ of undepreciated capital and the revenue
net of labor payments (Y (m, k, n) − wnd + (1 − δ)k − cf Ind>0) but lose the financial assets a
deposited with the intermediary. Entrepreneurs that default regain access to the financial mar-
kets the following period. The parameter φ ∈ [0, 1] indexes the strength of the legal institutions
in the economy, with φ = 1 indicating perfect financial markets and φ = 0 corresponding to an
economy with no credit markets. We study equilibria in which financial contracts are restricted
so that there is no default in equilibrium. This occurs when the amount of capital rented is
limited by the largest amount k(a, zm, zw;φ) consistent with entrepreneurs choosing to abide by
their financial contracts. To characterize rental limits, consider the profit maximization problem
of entrepreneurs that take as given the capital k used in the business operation:
π(zm, zw, a; k) ≡ max
m,n,nd,tm
{mγkνnθ − wnd − r(k − a) + a− δk − cf Ind>0} (2.3)
subject to
m = tmzm, (2.4)
n = (1− tm) ∗ zw + nd, (2.5)
where tm ∈ [0, 1], nd ≥ 0, k given. (2.6)
The following proposition extends results in Buera, Kaboski, and Shin (2011) to characterize
the rental limits k(a, zm, zw;φ).
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Proposition 1 Capital rental k by an entrepreneur with wealth a and skills (zm, zw) is enforce-
able if and only if
π(zm, zw, a; k) ≥ (1− φ) max
m,n,nd,tm
{mγkνnθ − wnd + (1− δ)k − cf Ind>0}
subject to
m = tmzm,
n = (1− tm) ∗ zw + nd,
where tm ∈ [0, 1], nd ≥ 0.
The upper bound on capital rental that is consistent with entrepreneurs choosing to abide by their
contracts can be represented by a function k(a, zm, zw;φ), which is increasing in a, zm, zw and
φ.
Proof. See appendix.
The income of an entrepreneur in state (zm, zw, a) making optimal production decisions given
prices and borrowing limits is given by
ye(zm, zw, a) ≡ max
k
{π(zm, zw, a; k)} (2.7)
subject to
k ≤ k(a, zm, zw;φ) (2.8)
The income of a household that choose to work for a wage is yw(zm, zw, a) = wzw+ra. Household
income is the maximum between the entrepreneurial and workers income:
y(zm, zw, a) = max{ye(zm, zw, a), yw(zm, zw, a)}. (2.9)
Households maximize expected discounted lifetime utility
max
cj ,aj+1
E{
J￿
j=1
βjU(cj)}
subject to
cj + aj+1 = y(zmj , zwj , aj),
cj , aj+1 ≥ 0,
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2.4 Time Allocation and Occupational Maps
We now study in partial equilibrium (e.g. for a fixed wage rate) how our theory can give rise to
three active occupational choices: workers, self-employed, and employers. We show that when
capital markets are perfect occupational choices are entirely determined by the ability ratio zwzm .
Individuals with a high zwzm ratio have a comparative advantage at working and choose to become
workers, individuals with a low zwzm ratio have a comparative advantage at entrepreneurship and
choose to become employers, and those with intermediate skill ratios prefer to be self-employed.
We also characterize how tight borrowing constraints (capital market imperfections) distort
occupational choices.
We start by analyzing the determinants of self-employment income. Self-employed individuals
choose how much time to allocate to managerial versus working activities and how much capital
to use in production. Using the linear homogeneity of the production function, the income of a
self-employed individual with a units of assets who uses k units of capital can be written as
yse =MPtm tm +MPtw tw +MPK k + ra− k(r + δ),
where MPtm and MPtw denote the marginal products of managerial time and working time,
respectively, and MPK represents the marginal product of capital. We are now ready to prove
the following proposition:
Proposition 2 (Self-employment) The optimal time devoted to management by self-employed
entrepreneurs (entrepreneurs not hiring outside labor) is t∗m =
γ
γ+θ . The marginal product of
their time is equated across its two uses (managerial and working time) and satisfies:
MPTse = rmw
￿
zγmz
θ
w
￿ 1
γ+θ
,
where rmw = γ ν
ν
1−ν
￿
θ
γ
￿ θ
1−ν
￿
1
r+δ+µ
￿ ν
1−ν
is the rate of return to the composite skill input￿
zγmzθw
￿ 1
γ+θ and µ is the Lagrange multiplier associated to the borrowing constraint. The in-
come of a self-employed individual with assets a is given by
yse = rmw
￿
zγmz
θ
w
￿ 1
γ+θ
+ µk + ra,
where k = k(zm, zw, a).
Proof. See appendix.
Proposition 2 establishes that self-employed individuals equate the marginal product of the time
allocated to managing and to working tasks. The marginal product of the self-employment
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time can be expressed as the product of the skill composite
￿
zγmzθw
￿ 1
γ+θ and the rate of return
rmw. The skill composite
￿
zγmzθw
￿ 1
γ+θ is a geometric average of the managerial and working
abilities of the self-employed individual. The return to the skill composite ( rmw) depends on
parameters of the production technology, the real interest rate (r), and the Lagrange multiplier
(µ) associated to the borrowing constraint. Note that the return to the skill composite decreases
with (µ). Hence, borrowing constraints generate heterogeneity in rate of returns to skills among
self-employed individuals.
Since workers’ income is given by
yw = wzw + ra,
it is immediate that yse − yw is independent of asset holdings. Hence, as shown in Proposition
3, when µ = 0 the decision of whether to work for a wage or to be self-employed only depends
on the ability ratio zwzm . On the contrary, when the borrowing constraint binds k = k(zm, zw, a)
occupational choice decisions depend on asset holdings because they affect the rate of return to
skills (e.g. the composite input
￿
zγmzθw
￿ 1
γ+θ ) and the rate of return to assets. These results are
summarized in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 (Self-employed vs Worker) Let R1 ≡
￿
rmw
w
￿ θ+γ
γ , where rmw is defined in
Proposition 2. Then,
1. If capital markets are perfect (φ = 1), working for a wage is preferred to self-employment
if and only if zwzm > R1.
2. If capital markets are imperfect (φ < 1), working for a wage is preferred to self-employment
if and only if
zw
zm
>
rmw + µk/ ￿zγmzθw￿ 1γ+θ
w
 θ+γγ ≡ R1,
where µ > 0 is the Lagrange multiplier associated to the borrowing constraint and k =
k(zm, zw, a).
When capital markets are perfect (φ = 1), the occupational choice decision between working
for a wage or being self-employed can be represented by a ray R1 that goes through the origin
in (zm, zw) space. Individuals with ability above this ray prefer to be a worker. In this case,
occupational choice decisions are independent of asset holdings and maximize the marginal
product of time. However, when capital markets are imperfect, occupational choice decisions
depend on asset holdings and do not maximize the marginal product of time. The occupational
choice between working and self-employment is now described by the curve R1 in (zm, zw) space.
Note that a proportional change in both skills decreases the income ratio yseyw because the increase
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in zm leads to a tighter borrowing constraint for a fixed asset level a, implying that the curve
R1 tilts down relatively to the ray R1 as zm increases. An increase in assets (a) relaxes the
borrowing constraint (µ decreases and rmw increases) making it more likely that individuals will
choose self-employment so that the position of the R1 depends on asset holdings.
We now analyze the decisions of employers. Employers choose how much of their time to allocate
to managerial versus working activities and how much capital (k) and (outside) labor services
(nd) to use in production. Using the linear homogeneity of the production function the income
of an employer with a units of assets can be written as
ye =MPtm tm +MPtw tw +MPnd nd +MPK k + ra− k(r + δ)− wnd − cf ,
where MPtm and MPtw denote the marginal products of managerial time and working time,
respectively, andMPK andMPnd represent the marginal product of capital and labor services.
We are now ready to prove the following proposition:
Proposition 4 (Employers)
1. The optimal time devoted to management by employers is t∗m = min
￿
tˆm, 1
￿
, where tˆ∗m ≡￿
zγmk(a,zm,zw;φ)νθ
w
￿
θzw
γ
￿θ−1￿ 11−θ−γ
. Moreover, denoting by ku(zm, zw) the level of capital
chosen by an unconstrained entrepreneur with ability (zm, zw), there exist a∗(zm, zw) <
ku(zm, zw) such that t∗m = 1 for all a ≥ a∗(zm, zw).
2. The marginal product of employer’s time satisfies:
MPTe = zmrm ≥ zw w(with strict inequality if tm = 1),
where rm = γ
￿￿
ν
(r+δ+µ)
￿ν ￿
θ
w
￿θ￿ 11−(ν+θ)
is the rate of return to the managerial input zm
and µ is the Lagrange multiplier associated to the borrowing constraint.
3. The income of an employer with ability (zm, zw) with assets a is given by
ye = zmrm + µk + ra− cf ,
where k = k(zm, zw, a)
Proof. See appendix.
Proposition 4 states that there is a threshold level of asset holdings a∗(zm, zw) such that for
assets below this level the marginal product of entrepreneurial time is equal to wzw and the
Chapter 2. Financial Frictions, Occupational Choice and Economic Inequality 54
time allocation problem of the employer features an interior solution in which the employer
performs both managing and working activities. If asset holdings are higher than the threshold
a∗(zm, zw), then the marginal product of entrepreneurial time is higher than that as a worker
and the time allocation problem exhibits a corner solution tm = 1.
The marginal product of employers’ time (MPTm) can be expressed as the product of managerial
skills zm and the rate of return rm on the employer’s managerial skill. The rate of return (rm)
depends on parameters of the production technology, the real interest rate (r), and the Lagrange
multiplier (µ) associated to the borrowing constraint. Note that borrowing constraints (µ)
generate heterogeneity in rate of returns to skills among employers.
Proposition 4 shows that when capital markets are perfect ( µ = 0) then the marginal product of
employer’s time is proportional to her managerial ability zm and the income difference between
being an employer and being self-employed ye − yse is independent of asset holdings. In this
case, Proposition 5 shows that the decision of whether to be an employer or to be self-employed
only depends on the ability ratio zwzm , provided the fixed cost of operation faced by employers
is equal to zero (cf = 0). There exist a constant ratio R2 such that individuals with a skill
ratio zwzm below R2 choose to be an employer. When the fixed cost of operation is positive, then
the occupational choice decision depends on comparative advantage (skill ratio zwzm ) and on the
absolute level of managerial ability zm. Now, to be an employer rather than self-employed the
ability vector (zm, zw) should satisfy
zw
zm
< R2(1− cfzmrmw )
γ+θ
θ . Intuitively, in the presence of fixed
cost of being an employer, employers need a minimum level of managerial ability zm in order
to recoup the fixed cost of operation. The occupational choice decision between employer and
self-employment is not only based on the skill ratio.
When capital markets are imperfect and borrowing constraints bind, occupational choice de-
cisions depend on asset holdings because both the marginal product of time and the return
to capital of both employed and self-employed individuals depend on their asset holdings (see
Proposition 5). Intuitively, an increase in asset holdings increases the employer region in the
occupational map in (zw, zm) relative to the self-employment (R2 in Proposition 5 shifts up).
The key is that borrowing constraints tend to be tighter for employers than self-employed since
employers need to operate at a larger scale.
Proposition 5 (Employer versus Self-employment) Let R2 ≡
￿
rm
rmw
￿ θ+γ
θ
, where rmw and
rm are the rate of returns to the skill composite
￿
zγmzθw
￿ 1
γ+θ and the managerial skill defined in
Propositions 2 and 4, respectively. Then,
1. If capital markets are perfect (φ = 1), individuals prefer to become employers relative to
self-employment when the ability ratio is such that zwzm < R2(1−
cf
zmrmw
)
θ+γ
θ .
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2. If capital markets are imperfect (φ < 1), individuals prefer to become employers relative to
self-employment when the ability ratio is such that
zw
zm
<
￿
rm
rmw
+
(µeke − cf )
zmrmw
− (µsekse)
zmrmw
￿ θ+γ
θ ≡ R2,
where µe and µse are the Lagrange multipliers associated to the borrowing constraints when
the individual is an employer or is self-employed, respectively, and ke and kse are the capital
used in production at these occupations.
Proposition 6 collects results characterizing occupational choice decisions when capital markets
are perfect (φ = 1). If the fixed cost of operation of employers is cf = 0, occupational choices are
only determined by the ability ratio zwzm . Depending on parameter values (equilibrium returns to
ability), the equilibrium may feature self-employed individuals or not. If equilibrium prices are
such that R1 > R2, then individuals with an ability ratio
zw
zm
> R1 work for a wage, individuals
with R1 >
zw
zm
> R2 are self-employed, and those with
zw
zm
< R2 are employers. A positive fixed
cost of operation (cf > 0), implies that employers require a minimum scale in order to operate
a profitable business so that the decision to be an employer depends both on the skill ratio
R1 >
zw
zm
> R2 and on the level of managerial ability zm.
Proposition 6 (Occupational maps when capital markets are perfect (φ = 1) Assume
that φ = 1. Let R1 ≡
￿
rmw
w
￿ θ+γ
γ and R2 ≡
￿
rm
rmw
￿ θ+γ
θ
, where rmw and rm are the rate of
returns to the skill composite
￿
zγmzθw
￿ 1
γ+θ and the managerial skill defined in Propositions 2 and
4, respectively.
1. If there are no fixed cost of operation of being an employer (cf = 0), then the optimal
occupational choice is the one that maximizes the marginal product of time and is only
determined by the skill ratio ( zwzm ) as follows:
(a) If equilibrium prices are such that R1 > R2, then individuals with an ability ratio
zw
zm
> R1 work for a wage, individuals with R1 >
zw
zm
> R2 are self-employed, and
those with zwzm < R2 are employers.
(b) If equilibrium prices are such that R1 < R2, there is no self-employed individuals in
equilibrium. Individuals with a skill ratio such that zww < zmrm choose to become
employers. Otherwise, they choose to work for a wage.
2. If employers incurred a positive fixed cost of operation (cf > 0), the decision to be an
employer depends on the skill ratio ( zwzm ) and on the absolute level of managerial ability
(zm). Individuals prefer to become employers relative to self-employment when the ability
ratio is such that zwzm < R2(1−
cf
zmrmw
).
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Summarizing, we have developed a theory with three occupational choices and characterize
occupational decisions. The theory implies that, in the absence of capital market imperfections,
the skill ratio zwzm drives occupational choices: Workers have a high
zw
zm
ratio, employers a low
zw
zm
ratio, and the self-employed have an intermediate skill ratio. Capital market imperfections
distort returns to skill and, thus, occupational choices. A tight borrowing constraint depresses
the rate of return to the managerial ability of employers and the return to the composite skill
input supplied by self-employed individuals. It also increases the rate of return to capital faced by
entrepreneurs. As a result, asset holdings matter importantly for occupational choice decisions
in the presence of financial frictions. These results can be illustrated by drawing the occupational
maps in our calibrated model economy. Figure 2.10 draws the occupational map when perfect
enforcement is introduced in the calibrated model economy. As shown in Proposition 6, when
capital markets are perfect occupational choices are determined by the zmzw skill ratio. In our
baseline economy, with limited enforcement (φ < 1), occupational choices are determined by
the skill ratio and asset holdings since borrowing constraints affect the returns to skills and
assets. Figure 2.11 represents graphically, for two fixed asset levels, how occupation varies
across individuals that differ on (zm, zw). In Panel a, the level of assets is fixed at the median
income and in Panel b it is fixed at the mean income. A comparison of the occupational maps,
reveal that capital market imperfections expand the region where self-employment is optimal at
the expense of the regions where employer and worker are the preferred occupational choices.
2.5 Quantitative Analysis
2.5.1 Calibration
We partition the parameters in the model economy in two. The first group includes the param-
eters that are set using estimates from other studies in the literature. The second group consists
of all the parameters that are calibrated by simulating the model economy.
Parameters set exogenously The model period is set to an year. The international interest
rate is set at 3%. The utility function is assumed to be of the CES type:
u(c) =
c1−σ
1− σ
with σ = 1.5. The parameters of the production function are set to standard values in the
literature: γ = .2, ν = .3, θ = .5 (see Guner, Ventura, and Xu (2008), Buera, Kaboski, and Shin
(2011)). The annual depreciation rate is set to at δ = 0.06.
Chapter 2. Financial Frictions, Occupational Choice and Economic Inequality 57
Calibrated parameters For ease of exposition, below we list the parameters to be calibrated
together with a corresponding target that helps identify each parameter. Nonetheless, it is
important to keep in mind that the calibration is a multidimensional mapping in which all
parameters and calibration targets are inter-related.
1. The discount factor β is chosen so that the capital to income ratio in the steady is equal
to 2.4, which is consistent with the capital to income ratio in Brazil (see Ju´nior, Bugarin,
Gomes, and Teixeira (2004)).
2. Enforcement of credit contracts φ to match a credit to GDP ratio of 43% in Brazil5.
3. The coefficients on the quartic polynomio on age determining how the two working and
managerial sills vary with age are set so that the age-profile of mean earnings for workers
and entrepreneurs are roughly consistent with the data.
4. Following Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2005), the parameters determining the stochas-
tic process on working ability such as the variance of fixed effects σ2αw ,σ
2
αm , persistence of
autoregressive process ρw, and the variance of the innovation to working ability over the
life-cycle σ2￿w to match the age profile of the variance of log wages.
5. There are various parameters determining the stochastic process on managerial ability (i)
the variance of fixed effect on managerial skills σ2αm ; (ii) variance of innovations to manage-
rial abilities (σ2￿m) ; and (iii) the persistence of the auto-regressive process on managerial
ability (ρm). To pin down these parameters, we target: (i) the proportion of entrepreneurs
and workers in the population of households (32% versus 68%); (ii) the variance of en-
trepreneurial log-earnings (1.06); and (iii) the persistence of being an employer between
two consecutive years (68%).
6. The parameter ρ driving the correlation between managerial and working skills is pinned
down by targeting the ratio of median earnings between entrepreneurs and workers.
7. The fixed cost of operation of employers cf is set to match the fraction of employers among
entrepreneurs (one fourth).
Discretization of shocks To solve the model numerically, we first find a finite state approx-
imation of the following bivariate process describing the life-cycle shocks to skills
ut = Aut−1 + ￿t,
5We use the average Private Credit/GDP from 2003 until to 2010 from the World Development Indicators
from the World Bank
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where ut is a 2 × 1 vector, A is a 2 × 2 matrix, and ￿ is a 2 × 1 vector with mean 0 and
variance-covariance matrix Σ = E(￿￿
￿
). Using that Σ is a symmetric matrix, we can express it
as follows:
Σ = QΛQ
￿
, (2.10)
where Λ is a diagonal matrix (with the eigenvalues of Σ in the diagonal) and Q is the matrix of
eigenvectors of Σ as columns. The bivariate process can be expresed
￿ut = ￿A￿ut−1 + ￿t,
where ￿ut = Qut, ￿A = Q￿AQ, and ￿t = Q￿t. The key to this transformation is that ￿t has a
diagonal variance-covariance matrix: E(￿t￿t￿) = Q￿ΣQ = Λ. We then approximate ￿ut with a
Markov chain with states given by a matrix ￿Ut with dimension 2 × 100. Then the states of
the Markov chain which approximate ut are given by the matrix U = Q￿Ut with dimension
2 × 100. Because of our life-cycle environment, the variance of shocks grow with age. To deal
with this feature, we allow the support of the shocks and the Markov chain to change with
age. The Markov chain is allowed to vary with age so that the finite state approximation of the
autoregressive bivariate process matches the unconditional variance of the continuous bivariate
shock process at each age.
Regarding fixed effects, the bivariate normal distribution is discretized with 3 values for working
skill and 5 values for managerial skills. As a result, there are 15 pairs of fixed effects. At each
age, there are 1500 possible pairs of skills (zw, zm).
2.5.2 Calibration results
We now discuss how the calibrated model economy matches the calibration targets. The values
of the calibrated parameters are reported in Table 2.1.
Table 2.2 shows that the model economy matches reasonably well the targets for the credit to
GDP ratio of 43% and the capital to income ratio of 2.4. Figure 2.5 compares the variance of
log-earnings of workers in the model economy with the Brazilian data. The model economy is
consistent with the fact that there is a large amount of inequality early in the life cycle and that
inequality grows substantially with age over the life cycle. The stochastic process on working
skills is characterized by a high persistence ( ρw close to 1), which is needed to match the linear
age-profile of the variance of log wages in the Brazilian data. This is consistent with the findings
of Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2005) for the US. Relatively to previous findings for the US
economy, the calibration requires a large variance of individuals fixed effects (σαw) to match the
high inequality of wages at age 20 in Brazil.
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The calibration implies that the variances of fixed effects and of the innovation of managerial
skills are much larger than the corresponding variances of working skills (see Table 2.1). This
is necessary for the model economy to be consistent with the large variance of entrepreneurial
earnings in the Brazilian data.
Table 2.3 compares the fraction of households that are workers, self-employed, and employers
in the calibrated model economy and in Brazil. The model economy matches quite closely the
fractions of workers (68%), self-employed (24%), and employers (8%) in the data. The calibration
also matches the fact that about 70% of the employers in Brazil at a given point in time are still
employers one year after (see Table 2.3). In the calibrated model economy the persistence of
entrepreneurial shocks is high (ρm = 0.78 ), but less than the persistence of shocks on working
ability (ρw = 0.98)
The calibration implies that the correlation between skills is positive but moderate (ρ = 0.1).
This is necessary for the economy to be consistent with the fact that ratio of median income
between entrepreneurs and workers is equal to 1 in the Brazilian data. In a sensitivity analysis,
we later calibrate two economies in which we exogenously set a high and low skill correlation. We
find that a high skill correlation implies a counterfactually high ratio of median income between
entrepreneurs and workers. Conversely, a calibration with a negative skill correlation implies
that the median income of entrepreneurs are below that of workers, which is also counterfactual.
Summing up, we believe that the calibrated model economy provides a reasonable account of
income inequality and occupational choices in Brazil.
2.5.3 Performance of baseline economy.
We now discuss how the baseline economy matches some facts on occupational transitions and on
the distribution of income across occupations that were not directly targeted in the calibration.
Table 2.4 reports predictions of the model economies on occupational transitions between the
three occupations considered (worker, self-employed, employer). While there are 9 possible
occupational transitions, we remind the reader that the calibration only targeted the persistence
of being an employer between two consecutive years. The baseline economy matches the patterns
on the persistence of occupational choices remarkably well (see Table 2.4). First, consistently
with the data, the model economies predict that being a worker is quite persistent: 90% of
workers in the model economy are workers one year later. This percentage is about 94% in the
data. Both in the baseline economy and in the data, entrepreneurs are less likely to remain in
their occupation than workers. Second, examining transition rates within the entrepreneurial
class, the calibrated model economy matches the fact that individuals are much more likely
to transit into employer from self-employment than from being a paid worker. In the data,
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individuals are about three times more likely to become employers if they are self-employed
rather than working for a wage. Indeed, the (annual) transition rate from self-employment into
employer is 22% while the transition rate from worker to employer is only 8%. In the model
these rates are 26% and 8%, respectively. Third, the (annual) transition rates out of employer
in the data implies that employers are much more likely to switch to self-employment (8%) than
to paid work (1%). In the model economy, these transition rates are 6% and 1%, respectively.
The model economy was calibrated to match two statistics on the distribution of income across
workers and entrepreneurs (ration of median income and the variance of income of each of
the two occupations). Figure 2.6 plots the distribution of income across these two occupation
categories in the data and in the model. The model was calibrated to match the fact that the
ratio of median income between entrepreneurs and workers is equal to one and that the variance
of entrepreneurial income is higher than that of workers. Figure 2.7 plots the distribution of
income across three occupations (e.g. the entrepreneurial category is subdivides in two groups:
employers and self-employed). The baseline economy is consistent with the fact that there
is substantial income heterogeneity in all three occupations. Moreover, as in the data, the
distribution of self-employment income is shifted to the left relative to that of workers and the
distribution of worker’s income is shifted to the left relative to that of employers. Nonetheless, we
emphasize that there is substantial heterogeneity among employers: Some low income employers
make less income than the median self-employed individual.
All in all, the model economy matches reasonable well patterns on occupational transitions and
distribution of income within and across occupations. While we could have built a theory with
three distinct skills (one for each occupation) to better match the facts, it is remarkable that
our theory with heterogeneity in two skills provides an excellent account of the patterns in the
data on the transition rates into and out of the employer occupation. Below, when performing
a sensitivity analysis, we evaluate other implications of the theory.
2.5.4 Experiment: Removing financial frictions.
In order to assess the effects of credit market institutions, we compute equilibrium in the baseline
economy under the assumption of perfect credit-enforcement institutions (φ = 1). We focus on
how capital markets impact on occupational choices, resource allocation, aggregate output, and
the distribution of income in the economy.
2.5.4.1 Occupational structure and financial frictions.
We find that removing financial frictions has important consequences on the occupational struc-
ture in the economy. Indeed, the fraction of entrepreneurs decreases from 33% to 18% (see Table
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2.5). Moreover, most of the decrease in entrepreneurship is due to a large decrease in the rate of
self-employment: While self-employment rates drop from 24% to 11%, the fraction of employers
drops by about 2 percentage points. Altogether, the theory is consistent with key stylized facts
on changes in the occupational structure with economic development. Consistently with the
data, the theory that the changes in rates of entrepreneurship across rich and poor countries is
due to changes in the self-employment rate. The theory is also consistent with the fact that the
fraction of workers in the labor force tends to increase with economic development: It increases
from 68% in the baseline economy to 82% with perfect capital markets.
The mechanism through which capital markets impact on the occupational structure is through
its impact on equilibrium wages. When financial frictions are removed, the wage rate increases
due to a better allocation of productive resources (employers are better selected and they can
use more capital). The increase in the wage rate strongly discourages self-employment, as can
be seen by comparing the self-employment region (green region) in the occupational maps drawn
in Figure 2.10 and Figure 2.11. Note that capital market imperfections expand the region where
self-employment is optimal at the expense of the regions where employer and worker are the
preferred occupational choices.
2.5.4.2 Output, resource allocation, and financial frictions.
The gain in aggregate output of eliminating financial frictions is quite large: It amounts to an
increase of 48% (see Table 2.6). There is also a substantial change in the sectorial composition of
output. While production by employers increase by 64%, production by self-employed decreases
by 53%. This should not be surprising given that the removal of financial frictions leads to large
reduction in the rates of self-employment in the baseline economy.
We now consider the impact of financial frictions on the efficiency of production. To this end, we
compute (TFP) as the (input-weighted) average productivity with which the composite capital
and labor input is used in production across entrepreneurs
TFP =
￿
i∈E
mγi
kνi n
θ
i￿
i∈E k
ν
i n
θdi
di,
where mi = (zmiti)γ is the managerial input used by entrepreneur i and similarly for ni and
ki. We find that aggregate TFP increases by 24% when financial frictions are removed. TFP
increased by 9% and 16% among self-employed and employers, respectively. Note that the
aggregate TFP gain (24%) is higher than the gain in each of the two sectors (9% and 16%).
The reason is that the removal of financial frictions leads to a reallocation of capital from self-
employed to employers: The share of aggregate capital used by the self-employed drops from
19% to 4%. Because employers tend to have a higher managerial ability than self-employed
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entrepreneurs, the reallocation of capital between these two groups enhances the aggregate
productivity gains of removing financial frictions.
Having said that self-employed are less productive entrepreneurs than employers, it is important
to recognize that self-employment reduces the impact of financial frictions on output. To assess
how self-employment affects the impact of financial frictions on aggregate output, we shut down
self-employment in the baseline economy and simulate the removal of financial frictions. We find
that the output gain is 53%, which is higher than the 48% increase obtained when simulating
the removal of financial frictions in the baseline economy. Hence, self-employment decreases
the negative impact of financial frictions on aggregate output. This finding can be explained
as follows: Financial frictions make it hard for young and talented entrepreneurs (individuals
with high managerial skills) to raise external funds. This effect is compounded by the fact
that financial frictions depress the equilibrium real wage, which makes it difficult to accumulate
savings by working for a paid wage when young. Self-employment allows talented entrepreneurs
to circumvent the low wage and build up savings, diminishing the negative impact of financial
frictions on aggregate output.
It is also interesting to decompose the gains in TFP due to the removal of financial frictions be-
tween the ones that are due to a better allocation of capital and labor inputs across entrepreneurs
(intensive margin) versus the gains coming from a better selection of entrepreneurs (extensive
margin). To this end, we re-distribute the capital in the baseline economy in order to equate
the marginal product of capital across all entrepreneurs.6 We find that capital reallocation leads
to a TFP gain of 1.3% for the self-employed and of 12% for employers (see Table 2.7). Hence,
reallocation of capital accounts for 14% of the gains in among the self-employed and for 76% of
the gains among employers. At the aggregate level, reallocation accounts for about half of the
TFP gains (54%).
The result that the intensive margin accounts for a much larger fraction of the TFP gains of
employers than of the self-employed, suggests that borrowing constraints are tight among the
former but not among the latter. Figure 2.8 plots the histogram of the ratio of the marginal
product of capital relative to the gross interest rate (r + δ) across employers and self-employed
individuals. Note that this ratio is equal to one for about 85% of self-employed, indicating that
the vast majority of the self-employed are not borrowing constraint. The reason is that self-
employed individuals tend to operate their businesses at a much smaller scale than employers
(their mean managerial input is about one-twentieth the one of employers) and do not need to
borrow much capital. On the other hand,the marginal product of capital varies substantially
across employers and the vast majority of them face a binding borrowing constraint.
6While the marginal product of the labor input is equated across employers, this equality does not hold
across self-employed individuals because we assume that labor input is not movable across the self-employed.
Alternatively, we could have allowed self-employed to pay a fixed cost in order to equate the marginal product of
labor. However, this would effectively imply an occupational switch (from self-employer to employer) which we
consider as part of the extensive margin.
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2.5.4.3 Impact of financial frictions on the distribution of income.
Financial frictions affect the distribution of income in many ways. While the overall effect on
income inequality is not large7, it has important effects on the sources of income inequality and
on its persistence over time.
We start by analyzing how financial frictions affect the distribution of capital versus non-labor
income. Capital income is computed as ra + µk. Non-capital income is computed as the sum
of labor income, managerial rents, and self-employment rents. Abusing terminology from now
on we refer to non-capital income as labor income. Table 2.14 compares the Gini indexes of
capital and labor income across economies. We find that capital income is much more unevenly
distributed than labor income both in the baseline economy and in the perfect capital market
economies. Surprisingly, we find that capital market imperfections have opposing effects on
the concentration of labor and capital income. Labor income is more evenly distributed in the
baseline economy than in the economy with perfect enforcement, with a Gini index of .52 in the
former economy and of 56 in the latter economy). On the other hand, the Gini index of capital
income is about 10 percentage points higher in the baseline economy. The opposite effects of
capital market imperfections on the distributions of capital income and labor income offset each
other and account for the small change in the Gini index of income.
The fact that the distribution of factor income varies so much across economies is symptomatic
of the resource misallocation prevalent under imperfect capital markets. The low concentration
of the distribution of labor income in the baseline economy is due to the fact that borrowing con-
straints distorts rate of returns to managerial ability (recall that µ > 0 reduces rm). Moreover,
in the baseline economy returns to managerial ability rm and managerial ability zm are strongly
negative correlated, with a correlation coefficient of −0.5. Thus, skillful managers tend to receive
low returns to their ability. On the other hand, the correlation coefficient between these two
variables is zero in the economy with perfect capital markets, as there is no heterogeneity in rate
of returns to ability.
Capital income is highly unequal in the baseline economy because there is substantial hetero-
geneity in the returns to capital. The interest rate on deposits (3%) is substantially smaller
than the average marginal product on capital obtained by employers (13.2% net of deprecia-
tion). Moreover, the marginal product of capital across employers varies importantly and its
distribution features a coefficient of variation above .60. Again, this fact is symptomatic of
resource being inefficiently allocated.
The presence of borrowing constraints imply that the returns to managerial ability are positively
correlated with capital income. Hence, the correlation between capital and labor income is equal
to .80 in the baseline economy, which is much larger than the .50 value in the economy with
7The Gini index of income decreases from 0.53 to 0.52 with the removal of financial frictions
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perfect capital markets. In the latter, the positive correlation between capital and labor income
is due to the fact that highly able people tend to hold more capital than low ability people but
not to rate of return differentials.
2.5.4.4 Capital markets and the persistence of income.
To evaluate the effect of imperfect capital markets on the persistence of income, we simulate data
in the baseline economy and in the economy with perfect capital markets and run the following
regression in
log(yt,j) = αj + βlog(yt−1,j) + b2aget + b3age2t , (2.11)
where ytj represents the income of individual j at age t, αj is an individual fixed effect, and β
measures the persistence of log-income. We find that removing financial frictions in the baseline
economy reduces the estimated value of β from 0.81 to 0.74. Income is more persistent in the
baseline economy because assets are positively correlated with rate of returns and because assets
matter for occupational choices. On the other hand, when there is perfect enforcement assets do
not affect rates of returns and occupational choices and the persistence of income is only driven
by the persistence of shocks and asset holdings.
2.5.4.5 Capital markets and the distribution of consumption.
Financial frictions have an heterogeneous impact across households. To assess the distributive
impact of financial frictions, Table 2.15 compares consumption inequality in the baseline model
economies with that in an economy with perfect enforcement of credit contracts φ = 1. We find
that financial frictions have important effects on the distribution of consumption. We find that
the Gini coefficient of consumption is 2 percentage points lower in the economy with perfect
enforcement of credit contracts (φ = 1). It is interesting that financial frictions have opposite
effects on the inequality at the top and the bottom of the consumption distribution. The ratio of
consumption between the 10th percentile and the 50th percentile of the consumption distribution
is equal to 0.29 in the baseline model economy. This ratio increases to 0.33 in the economy with
φ = 1. On the other hand, the consumption ratio between households at the 90th and 50th
percentile increases from 3.3 to 3.44. Hence, relative to the perfect credit economy, the baseline
model economy has more inequality at the bottom of the consumption distribution but less
inequality at the top. The first effect is more important than the latter effect so that overall
consumption inequality, as measured by the Gini index, is higher in the baseline economy than
in the φ = 1 economy.
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2.5.5 Is the skill distribution important for the aggregate effects of financial
frictions?
To show that the skill distribution matters importantly for the impact of financial frictions
we consider two new economies in which we fixed exogenously the skill correlation. In one
economy, the skill correlation is fixed to a high positive value (ρ = 0.8 and in the other to a
high negative value (ρ = −0.8). The two economies are re-calibrated to the same targets of the
baseline economy, except for the fact that we do not target the ratio of median earnings between
entrepreneurs and workers. We then compare across economies the impact of removing financial
frictions.
2.5.5.1 The impact of financial frictions across economies.
The output gains of removing financial frictions vary substantially across the three calibrated
model economies (see Table 2.10).8 The output gains range from 36% to 55% as the correlation
between skills decreases from 0.8 to -0.8. Similarly, the TFP gains across these economies range
from 22% to 31%. Hence, financial frictions have much lower effects on output per worker and
TFP when skills are (strongly) positively correlated. The correlation between skills matters for
the impact of financial frictions because it shapes the correlation between savings and manage-
rial talent in equilibrium. In particular, the financing problems faced by talented entrepreneurs
are less severe when entrepreneurs are also talented workers. When individuals are highly skill-
ful both at managing and at working, they can work for a wage and build savings in order to
diminish the negative effects of borrowing constraints on their entrepreneurial income. On the
other hand, talented entrepreneurs find it more difficult to accumulate savings when skills are
negatively correlated, making borrowing constraints tighter. Moreover, talented entrepreneurs
have a harder time building up savings relative to other individuals with lower entrepreneurial
talent because the latter have higher working skills. By allowing individuals with low managerial
talent to build savings faster, financial frictions provide low skilled managers with a compar-
ative advantage at entrepreneurship. These effects explain why the skill correlation matters
importantly for the output and TFP losses caused by financial frictions.
A key innovation of our theory is that it allows entrepreneurs to choose what fraction of their time
they allocate to managing versus working. This assumption allows our theory to be consistent
with the fact that self-employment is quite important in poor countries. We now show that
self-employment matters for the quantitative impact of financial frictions in the three calibrated
model economies. To this end, we shut down self-employment in all economies and simulate
the impact of financial frictions. We find that in all the calibrated model economies the output
8The match of the calibrated targets is better in the baseline economy. The calibrated parameters and cali-
bration results for the economies with very positive or very negative correlation are available upon request.
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gains due to the elimination of financial frictions increase substantially in the absence of self-
employment (by between 6 to 8 percentage points). Since wages are low with financial frictions,
self-employment allows individuals with high managerial skill to attain higher earnings. This
effect is most important in the economy with negative correlation of skills since in this economy
individuals with high managerial ability tend to have lower working ability.
To further understand how the skill correlation matters for the impact of financial frictions,
we analyze how financial frictions distort the rate of returns to the various production inputs.
Recall that when capital market are perfect the rate of return of all productive inputs are
equalized across production units. However, rates of return do vary across production units
under financial frictions (see Section 4). We now show that the skill correlation parameter ρ
matters importantly for the variation in rate of returns caused by financial frictions. Table
2.12 compares the variation in rates of returns among employers and self-employed individuals
in the calibrated model economies. The standard deviation of the marginal product of capital
among employers is twice as large in the economy with ρ = −0.8 than in the economy with
ρ = 0.8 (.14 versus .07). The variation in rates of returns to capital reflects the variation
in the tightness of the borrowing constraint across entrepreneurs.9 The results in Table 2.12
show that when skills are positively correlated there is less heterogeneity in rates of return on
capital across entrepreneurs than when skills are negatively correlated. Intuitively, the financing
problems faced by talented entrepreneurs are less severe when entrepreneurs are also talented
workers. This is because households with high working skills can rapidly accumulate savings
and alleviate the financial constraints that limit the operation of their businesses. On the other
hand, when skills are negatively correlated borrowing constraints are tighter because talented
entrepreneurs find it more difficult to accumulate savings.
Borrowing constraints also generate heterogeneity on the rate of return to the managerial input
among employers (rm) and on the rate of return on the self-employment composite(rmw). Both
of these returns decrease with the tightness of financial constraints (see Section 4). Table 2.12
shows that the variation in rates of return to the managerial input among employers is about
twice as large in the economy with ρ = −0.8 than in the economy with ρ = 0.8 (0.31 versus
0.17.) Moreover, while in all economies the return to the managerial skill is negatively correlated
with the level of managerial ability, this correlation is the lowest in the economy with ρ = −0.8
(about −0.63). When skills are strongly negatively correlated, the tight borrowing constraints
faced by entrepreneurs with high managerial skills imply that they obtain a lower return to their
skills than less able entrepreneurs. In this case financial frictions generate a strong comparative
advantage at entrepreneurship for households with lower managerial talent but higher working
ability, reducing the average entrepreneurial ability, and total factor productivity. Table 2.9
shows that changes in TFP associated with the elimination of financial frictions range from
9Recall that the marginal product of capital can be expressed as MPK = r + δ + µ, where µ represents the
Lagrange multiplier associated to the borrowing constraint (see Section 4).
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31% to 22%, with the largest (lowest) increase attained in the economy with strongly negative
(positive) correlation of skills.
2.5.5.2 Comparing economies with different correlation of skills
We have shown that the impact of financial frictions vary substantially across the three calibrated
model economies. Then, in order to assess the impact of financial frictions in the Brazilian
economy it is important to use Brazilian data to test the predictions of the calibrated model
economies.
Skill correlation and distribution of income across occupations. Figure 2.12 shows that
the calibrated model economies differ importantly in the distribution of income by occupation
(workers versus entrepreneurs). The economy with strongly correlated shocks ρ = 0.80 is grossly
at odd with the brazilian data: It counterfactually predicts that the distribution of earnings
of workers is shifted to the left relative to that of entrepreneurs. The economy with strongly
negative correlated shocks ρ = −0.80 is also at odds with the brazilian data since it implies that
the distribution of earnings of workers is shifted to the right relative to that of entrepreneurs. On
the other hand, our baseline economy (with ρ = 0.10) fits the brazilian evidence on the income
distribution across occupations reasonably well. Indeed, the baseline economy was calibrated
to match the ratio of median income between workers and entrepreneurs (which is 1.0 both in
Brazil and in the baseline model economy). This statistic takes a value of 0.7 in the economy
with ρ = 0.8 and a value of 1.3 when ρ = −0.8.
Figure 2.13 compares the distribution of income in the calibrated model economies and Brazil
when the population is divided in three occupational groups (workers, self-employed, and employ-
ers). The economy with strongly correlated shocks counterfactually predicts that the earnings
distribution of self-employed individuals is shifted to the right relative to that of workers. As ρ
decreases, the distribution of earnings of self-employed individuals shifts to the left. As a result,
consistently with the evidence, the economies with ρ = 0.10 and −0.80 exhibit a distribution
of earnings of self-employed households that is shifted to the left relative to that of workers.
Overall, the economy with ρ = .10 is the one that fits the evidence best. Relative to the data,
the economy with a strong negative skill correlation implies that the self-employed individuals
have too low earnings relative to workers.
We now discuss why the correlation between skills matters importantly for the income distribu-
tion across occupations. When ρ is sufficiently high, the correlation between ln(zmt/zwt) and
ln(zwt) becomes positive. In this case, a high skill ratio zmt/zwt is also associated with high
values of zmt and zwt so that households that have a comparative advantage at managing (high
zmt/zwt) also have an absolute advantage in both skills. When entrepreneurs have an absolute
advantage in both occupations, highly skilled workers tend to have a comparative advantage at
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managing and choose the entrepreneurial occupation. Low skill workers do not have a compara-
tive advantage at managing and choose to work for a wage. As a result, the earnings distribution
among entrepreneurs is shifted to the right relative to the earnings distribution among workers
and earnings inequality between occupations is large. On the other hand, when the correlation
between ln(zmt/zwt) and ln(zwt) is negative households in one occupation tend to be better
at that occupation than households choosing the other occupation. Earnings inequality across
occupations is not as large as in the absolute advantage case.
It is easy to show that the skill ratio and the working skill are jointly log-normally distributed
for each age t:￿
ln(zmt/zwt)
ln(zwt)
￿
∼ N
￿￿
0
0
￿
,
￿
σ2mt + σ
2
wt − 2ρwmtσwtσmt ρwmtσwtσmt − σ2wt
ρwmtσwtσmt − σ2wt σ2wt
￿￿
The absolute advantage case arises when the correlation between ln(zmt/zwt) and ln(zwt) is
positive, which holds if and only if
ρwmt >
σwt
σmt
Thus, the correlation of skills have to be sufficiently strong for the absolute advantage case to
hold. Figure 2.9 graphs the correlation between ln(zmt/zwt) and ln(zwt) for the three calibrated
model economies. The economy with ρ = 0.80 is the only one with a positive correlation. In this
economy, households with high managerial ability tend to have an absolute advantage in skills
(have higher managerial and working skills). The economy with ρ = 0.10 exhibits a correlation
between ln(zmt/zwt) and ln(zwt) of roughly −0.30.
Skill correlation and the persistence of earnings. The correlation between skills also
matter for the persistence of earnings over time. Intuitively, earnings are less volatile when skills
are positively correlated than negatively correlated. To compare the persistence of earnings
across the calibrated model economies, for each economy we simulate artificial data and run the
regression in (2.11). We find that the persistent of log-income increases from 0.73 to 0.84 as ρ
increases from −0.8 to 0.8. Unfortunately, we do not have panel data from Brazil to estimate
the persistence of income in Brazil. Nonetheless, we can use consumption data from Brazilian
households to test the predictions of the theory. The idea is that consumption theory implies
that permanent income is a key determinant of consumption decisions. Hence, the higher the
persistence of income the higher should be the cross-sectional correlation between consumption
and income across households (e.g. the correlation between consumption and income at a given
date t). Table 2.13 shows that the correlation between consumption and income varies widely
across the calibrated model economies: from 0.24 when ρ = −0.8, to .79 when ρ = 0.1, and up
to 0.85 when ρ = 0.8. This correlation is 0.71 in the Brazilian data.
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Skill correlation and selection of entrepreneurs. The skill correlation matters importantly
for how entrepreneurs are selected from the wage distribution. This is shown by comparing wages
at a given point in time between those who become entrepreneurs in the following period relative
to those who did not. In particular, this is done by running the following regression on log wages:
log(yt−1) = b0 + b1 ∗ age+ b2age2 + b3 ∗ entrepreneurt,
where yt−1 denotes wage income in period t− 1 and entrepreneurt is a dummy that takes value
of 1 if the individual becomes an entrepreneur in period t. This regression is run for the three
calibrated model economies as well as for the Brazilian data.10
We find that in the Brazilian data, entrepreneurs are drawn negatively from the wage distribution
(the coefficient b3 is negative and equal to -0.13). The baseline economy also implies a negative
coefficient with a value of −0.36 (see Table 2.11). The economy with ρ = 0.8 a positive value of
b3. The economy with strongly negative correlated skills implies a too low value for b3 (-0.86).
To investigate whether self-employed are differently selected from the wage distribution relative
to employers, we run the wage regression above but allowing for a dummy for self-employment.
We then consider another specification in which we allow for a dummy to indicate those workers
who switch into employer. We find that in the Brazilian data self-employed tend to be negatively
selected from the wage distribution (b3 = −0.24) but that employers tend to be positively selected
(b3 = 0.43). The baseline economy (ρ = 0.1) is consistent with these patters (the dummy for
self-employment is -0.43 and the one for employers is 0.50).
Altogether, the Brazilian evidence reviewed supports the economy with a moderately positive
correlation between managerial and working skills (ρ = 0.1).
2.5.6 The political economy of financial frictions
While it is well understood that financial frictions can have a large negative impact on aggregate
output and total factor productivity, it is less clear why the institutions leading to poor property
rights and contract enforcement are so persistent. In this section we use our theory to gain some
insights into the political economy of financial frictions. In our theory, financial frictions have an
heterogeneous impact across individuals that differ on age, wealth, and skills. Since our model
economy was calibrated to Brazilian household data, we use our theory to assess the distribution
of welfare gains of eliminating financial frictions in the Brazilian economy.
We assume that the baseline economy (ρ = 0.10) is in steady state and that suddenly and
unexpectedly there is a once and for all institutional reform that increases φ to 1. On impact,
10While the Brazilian data is not a panel, we have data on the occupational choices of individuals one year
apart.
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the wealth distribution does not matter for occupational choice decisions. Now, the skill ratio
zm
zw
is the only determinant of occupational choice decisions. Workers who could not operate
as entrepreneurs because of binding borrowing constraints can now start a business. Moreover,
entrepreneurs who were initially borrowing constraint see their managerial rents (rmzm) and
entrepreneurial income increase (see the discussion in Section 4). The importance of this effect
varies across individuals: It is more important for talented entrepreneurs (high zm) because,
ceteris paribus, they were more likely to be initially constrained. As talented entrepreneurs raise
their demand of capital relative to less talented entrepreneurs, capital is reallocated towards
more productive entrepreneurs, increasing the demand for labor, and the equilibrium wage rate.
The rise in wages decrease the profits of entrepreneurs. Hence, employers’ income can go up or
down depending on whether the increase in managerial rents is higher or lower than the increase
in labor costs.
The financial reform has non-trivial effects on the distribution of income. Occupational choices
of individuals are crucial for understanding how the reform impacts on them. Keeping fixed the
occupational choices of the initial steady state, workers gain with the reform since the wage rate
increase. Self-employed also gain since they can borrow more. Unconstrained employers loose
since wage payments go up but their managerial rents do not increase. Constrained employers
may gain or loose depending on whether the increase in managerial rents outweighs the increase
in wages. Since the increase in managerial rents is likely to be more important for talented
entrepreneurs, these entrepreneurs are more likely to see their income increase. The untalented
entrepreneurs who were operating businesses prior to the reform are likely to see their income
go down and to switch occupations.
We now explain how we compute the distribution of welfare gains from the reform. The small
open economy assumption simplifies the computation significantly. Once the reform takes place,
the marginal product of capital will be equated across entrepreneurs and will be equal to the
international interest rate plus the depreciation rate of capital. On impact, competition for
workers will drive the wage rate to its new long run value, which increases on impact by about
40%. While the distribution of wealth, consumption, and income may change for some periods
after the reform, all macroeconomic aggregates (capital, GDP, wage rate) will be constant after
the initial period of the reform. Since there are no transitional dynamics in the macroeconomic
aggregates, we can then compute the distribution of welfare gains for all individuals alive at the
moment of the reform as follows:
1. Simulate the distribution of households across states s = (age, assets, zm, zw) from the
initial steady state prior to the reform.
2. For each household in state s, compute the permanent consumption compensation in the
original steady state that will let the household attain the same utility as in the perfect
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credit economy. Denoting by V baseline(s) the discounted lifetime utility of a household in
the baseline economy, and V φ=1(s) the value function in the perfect enforcement economy,
the consumption compensation λ(s) is computed as follows:
λ(s) =
￿
V φ=1(s)
V baseline(s)
￿ 1
1−σc − 1,
where σc denotes the curvature of the period utility function in consumption ( σc = 1.5).
Households with λ(s) > 0 gain from the elimination of enforcement problems. Households
with λ(s) < 0 see their welfare decrease with the reform of financial market institutions.
We find that the average welfare gain among households alive at the period of the institutional
reform is 16.5%. The standard deviation of the distribution of welfare gains is 13.5%. Figure
2.14 shows the distribution of welfare gains across the population and documents that there is
substantial heterogeneity. While the vast majority of households gain from the reform, about
8.7% of the population see their welfare decrease with the reform. Who are the households that
lose with the reform?
Figure 2.15, 2.16, 2.17, 2.18, show the age, asset, and managerial-skill distributions among those
who oppose and support the reform. We find that households that lose from the reform tend to
be older, richer, and exhibit higher managerial skills and lower working skills than households
that support the reform. These findings are just reflecting that occupational choices are crucial
for understanding the political economy of the reform: Among the households that are worse off
with the reform, about 93% of them would have been entrepreneurs on the period of the reform
had the reform not taken place, and 66% would have been employers.
Employers are a positive selection from the population distribution of managerial skills. Then
, the fact that about two thirds of those who oppose the reform are employers explains why
the managerial ability of those supporting the reform is higher than that of those opposing the
reform. Nonetheless, not all employers support the reform: About 36% of employers in the initial
equilibrium benefit from the elimination of enforcement problems. We find that the employers
benefiting from the reform tend to be of higher managerial ability than those who oppose it. The
reason is that high ability employers are more likely to be borrowing constrained than low ability
entrepreneurs. As a result, they are more likely to operate at an inefficient scale and to gain more
from the elimination of enforcement problems. On the other hand, the financial reform hurts
many of the lower skill employers and force them to change their occupation status: About 46%
of the entrepreneurs that oppose to the reform and would have been employers had the reform
not taken place, do not hire any labor after the reform (most of them become self-employed
after the reform). The wage hike after the reform makes it unprofitable for these entrepreneurs
to hire outside labor.
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Summing up, while most households benefits from a reform that eliminates enforcement prob-
lems, the majority of employers (about two thirds) lose from the reform. By depressing the
demand for labor, limited enforcement depresses the equilibrium wage rate, increasing the prof-
its of employers. Obviously, entrepreneurs as a group will benefit even more by forming a cartel
in order to restrict labor demand and depress the wage rate. This achieves the goal of depressing
the wage rate but without distorting the capital markets. However, this cartel agreement is not
incentive compatible as each entrepreneur will have incentives to violate the group agreement
and hire labor. Importantly, limited enforcement is an incentive feasible mechanism that leads
to a depress wage rate. Our theory thus suggests that employers may have a vested interested
in maintaining a status quo with low enforcement.
2.6 Conclusions
We develop a theory of entrepreneurship, financial frictions, and economic inequality in Brazil.
The key innovation of our theory is to extend the Lucas (1978) model in order to incorporate
heterogeneity in two skills: − working and managerial skills. This modeling feature is necessary
for the theory to be consistent with evidence on the income distribution across occupations in
Brazil. Moreover, the theory has the novel implication that some entrepreneurs will not hire any
outside labor and be own account workers (or self-employed entrepreneurs), which is consistent
with the cross-country evidence that the high rates of entrepreneurship in poor countries, such
as in Brazil, is mostly due to the prevalence of self-employed workers. We show that financial
frictions have a non-trivial impact on inequality: On the one hand, they lead to higher and
persistent inequality by generating variation in returns to skills and by making these returns
depend on asset holdings. On the other hand, since borrowing constraints tend to be tighter for
highly skill than for low skill individuals, financial frictions reduce inequality by diminishing the
rents obtained by highly skilled individuals relative to a situation with perfect capital markets.
The model economy is used to simulate the effects of removing financial frictions in Brazil. We
find that the changes on the occupational structure are large: The fraction of entrepreneurs
decreases from 33% to 18%, with the bulk of the decrease in entrepreneurship explained by
the large decrease in the rate of self-employment. The gains in aggregate output of removing
financial frictions amounts to 48%, with asymmetric effects in the sectorial composition of output:
While production of employers increase by 64%, production of the self-employed decreases by
53%. We also simulate the impact of removing financial frictions when self-employment is shut
down in the baseline economy. We find that the output gain is 53%, which is higher than the
48% increase obtained in the baseline economy. Hence, self-employment decreases the negative
impact of financial frictions on aggregate output. We find that capital market imperfections have
opposing effects on the concentration of labor income and capital income. Labor income is more
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evenly distributed in the economy with imperfect capital markets than in the economy with no
financial frictions (with a Gini index of .52 versus a Gini index .56 in the latter economy). This
is because financial frictions depress the rents earn by highly able entrepreneurs relative to an
economy with perfect capital markets. On the other hand, the Gini index of capital income is
about 10 percentage points higher in the economy with imperfect credit markets.
We evaluate the distribution of welfare gains and losses of eliminating financial frictions. While
the vast majority of households gain from a reform that eliminates capital market imperfections,
about 8.7% of the population see their welfare decrease with the reform. Households that lose
from the reform tend to be older, richer, and exhibit higher managerial skills and lower working
skills than households that support the reform. These findings are just reflecting that occu-
pational choices are crucial for understanding the political economy of the reform: Among the
households that are worse off with the reform, about 93% of them would have been entrepreneurs
on the period of the reform had the reform not taken place, and 66% would have been employers.
Our theory thus suggests that employers in Brazil may have a vested interested in maintaining
a status quo with low enforcement.
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Table 2.1: Calibrated Parameters
ρw,m = 0.1
ρw 0.98
ρm 0.78
σ2α,w 0.38
σ2α,m 1.59
σ2w 0.03
σ2m 0.99
cf 0.10
φ 0.23
β 0.995
Table 2.2: Calibration Results-Model Aggregates
Data Model
K/Y 2.4 2.3
Credit/GDP 43% 42%
Var Log(Earn)-Entrepreneurs 1.1 1.2
Table 2.3: Calibration Results-Occupational Structure
Fraction Data Model
Workers 68% 67%
Self-Employed 24% 24%
Employers 8% 9%
Emp to Emp 70% 68%
Table 2.4: Performance of the Model-Transitions
Transitions Data Model
W to W 94% 90%
SE to W 5% 9%
E to W 1% 1%
W to SE 14% 28%
SE to SE 78% 64%
E to SE 8% 8%
W to E 8% 6%
SE to E 22% 26%
E to E 70% 68%
In the table above we use W for Workers, SE for Self-Employed and E for Employers.
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Table 2.5: Occupational Structure and Financial Frictions
Occupation Baseline Economy No Frictions
Workers 67% 82%
Self-Employed 24% 11%
Employers 9% 7%
Table 2.6: Aggregate Effects of Removing Financial Frictions
Changes in % Output TFP
Aggregate 48 24
Self-Employed -53 9
Employers 64 16
Table 2.7: TFP and Financial Frictions
Changes in % TFP TFPReallocation
Aggregate 24 13 (54%)
Self-Employed 9 1.3 (14%)
Employers 16 12 (76%)
Table 2.8: Income Inequality and Financial Frictions
φ = 0.23 φ = 1
Gini Labor Income 0.52 0.56
Gini Capital Income 0.67 0.59
Corr (cap inc., lab inc.) 0.80 0.50
Persistence of inc. 0.81 0.74
Table 2.9: Changes in Output-From benchmark to φ = 1
ρ = 0.1
Output Change (%)- Baseline 48
Output Change (%)- No Labor Heterogeneity 48
Output Change (%)- No Self-Employed 54
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Table 2.10: Changes in Output-From Benchmark to φ = 1
ρ
-0.8 0.1 0.8
Output Change (%)- Baseline 55 48 37
Output Change (%)- No Labor Heterogeneity 47 48 41
Output Change (%)- No Self-Employed 63 54 44
Table 2.11: Skill Correlation ρ and the Selection of Entrepreneurs
ρ
-0.8 0.1 0.8
Output Change (%)- Baseline 55 48 37
Output Change (%)- No Labor Heterogeneity 47 48 41
Output Change (%)- No Self-Employed 63 54 44
Table 2.12: Statistics on returns for different occupations and TFP gains
ρw,m = 0.1
TFP gains (%) 15
Employers
Std. Dev. MPKe 0.10
Std. Dev. ce 0.19
corr(ce, zm) -0.55
Self-Employed
Std. Dev. MPKse 0.06
Std. Dev. cse 0.07
corr(cse, zm) -0.30
For φ = 1 the standard deviation is 0 for all variables
ce is the return to managerial input for employers
cse is the return to the composite input for self-employed
MPKe,MPKse are the marginal product of capital for employers and self-employed respectively
Table 2.13: Implications of ρ for earnings and consumption
Data Model
Ratio Median Earnings Worker to Entrepreneur 1.0 1.0
corr(earningst, earningst−1) N.A. 0.81
corr(earningst, consumptiont) 0.71 0.79
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Table 2.14: Gini Inex-Labor and Capital Income
Gini Index
φ = 0.23 φ = 1
Labor Income 0.52 0.56
Capital Income 0.67 0.59
Table 2.15: Consumption Inequality and Financial Frictions
φ = 0.23 φ = 1
Gini 0.50 0.48
p90/p10 11.5 10.33
p90/p50 3.29 3.44
p10/p50 0.29 0.33
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Figure 2.1: Variance of Log Earnings in Brazil
Source: Author’s Elaboration based on PME 2003-2010
Figure 2.2: Occupational Structure across Countries
Source: Author’s Elaboration based on ILO 2008
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Figure 2.3: Distribution of Earnings in Brazil by Occupation-I
Source: Author’s Elaboration based on PME 2003-2010
Figure 2.4: Distribution of Earnings in Brazil by Occupation-II
Source: Author’s Elaboration based on PME 2003-2010
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Figure 2.5: Variance of Log(Earnings)-Model vs Data
Source: Author’s Elaboration based on PME 2003-2010
Figure 2.6: Distribution of Earnings-Data vs Model I
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Figure 2.7: Distribution of Earnings-Data vs Model II
Figure 2.8: MPK and Market Return on Capital
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Figure 2.9: Correlation between zmzw and zw for different ρw,m
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Figure 2.10: Occupational Map-φ = 1
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Figure 2.11: Occupational Maps Benchmark Economy
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Figure 2.12: Distribution of Earnings-Data vs Model I
Figure 2.13: Distribution of Earnings-Data vs Model II
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Figure 2.14: Welfare Gains from Financial Reform
Figure 2.15: Age Distribution of Winners and Losers from the Reform
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Figure 2.16: Wealth Distribution and the Reform
Figure 2.17: Distribution of Managerial Ability and the Reform
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Figure 2.18: Distribution of Managerial Ability and the Reform among Employers
Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 1
Appendix A.1: Labor for the smaller firm operating
The amount of labor demanded by the smaller firm is:
￿(φ∗iii) =
q(φ∗iii)
φ∗iii
+ κdi
q(φ∗iii) =
r(φ∗iii)
p(φ∗iii)
from equation (??) → r(φ∗iii) = σwiκdi
and from equation (1.5) → p(φ∗iii) =
σ
σ − 1
wi
φ∗iii
then → q(φ∗iii) = (σ − 1)κdi φ∗iii
￿(φ∗iii) = σκ
d
i
Appendix A.2: Aggregation
In this section I will show how to get the weighted average productivity of firms producing and
selling in each country, as well as the aggregate price and production.
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From equation 1.22 we obtain the total mass of firms producing and the total mass of firms
selling in country i. Let us define the average productivity of firms performing each activity:
φ˜iii =
￿￿ ∞
φ∗iii
φσ−1µidφ
￿ 1
1−σ
φ˜kii =
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φ∗kii
φσ−1µidφ
￿ 1
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φ∗kki
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￿ 1
1−σ
φ˜jki =
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φ∗jki
φσ−1µidφ
￿ 1
1−σ
Using the expressions from above we can define the weighted average productivity as:
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Let us write now the equation for aggregate price in country i (equation 1.20)
Pi =
￿￿
φ∗iii
(piii(φ))
1−σMiµi(φ)dφ+
￿
k ￿=i
￿
φ∗ikk
(pikk(φ))
1−σMkµk(φ)dφ (A.3)
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.
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now, replace pikj(φ) ∀i, j, k using equation 1.5 in the previous expression to obtain:
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We can replace the integral terms by each of the average productivities, and we get:
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Note that the term inside brackets is
(Msi )
1
σ−1
φ˜si
, and that p(φ˜si ) =
wi
ρφ˜si
. Then
P = (M si )
1
1−σ p(φ˜si )
In a similar way we can derive the equation for aggregate GDP.
GDPi =
￿
φ∗iii
riii(φ)Miµidφ+
￿
k ￿=i
￿
φ∗kii
rkii(φ)Miµidφ
+
￿
k ￿=i
￿
φ∗iik
riik(φ)Mkµkdφ+
￿
k ￿=j
￿
k ￿=i
￿
φ∗kij
rkij(φ)Mjµjdφ
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Replacing r(φ) by the expressions found in equation 1.6 we get:
GDPi =
￿
φ∗iii
E1i P
σ−1
i
￿
ρφ
wi
￿σ−1
Miµidφ+
￿
k ￿=i
￿
φ∗kii
E1kP
σ−1
k
￿
ρφ
wiτki
￿σ−1
Miµidφ
+
￿
k ￿=i
￿
φ∗iik
E1i P
σ−1
i
￿
ρφ
wiγik
￿σ−1
Mkµkdφ
+
￿
k ￿=j
￿
k ￿=i
￿
φ∗kij
E1kP
σ−1
k
￿
ρφ
wiγijτki
￿σ−1
Mjµjdφ
GDPi = E
1
i P
σ−1
i
￿
ρ
wi
￿σ−1
Mi
￿
φ∗iii
φσ−1µidφ+
￿
k ￿=i
E1kP
σ−1
k
￿
ρ
wiτki
￿σ−1
Mi
￿
φ∗kii
φσ−1µidφ
+
￿
k ￿=i
E1i P
σ−1
i
￿
ρ
wiγik
￿σ−1
Mk
￿
φ∗iik
φσ−1µkdφ
+
￿
k ￿=j
￿
k ￿=i
E1kP
σ−1
k
￿
ρ
wiγijτki
￿σ−1
Mj
￿
φ∗kij
φσ−1µjdφ
We can replace again the integral terms by the average productivities for each occupation, and
operating we get:
GDPi = E
1
i P
σ−1
i
￿
ρ
wi
￿σ−1 ￿
Miφ˜
1−σ
iii +
￿
k ￿=i
E1k
E1i
￿
Pk
Piwiτki
￿σ−1
Mkiiφ˜
1−σ
kii
+
￿
k ￿=i
￿
1
γik
￿σ−1
Miikφ˜
1−σ
iik
￿
k ￿=j
￿
k ￿=i
E1k
E1i
￿
Pk
Piγijτki
￿σ−1
Mjφ˜
1−σ
kij
￿
Note that the term in brackets is equal to Mpi ∗
￿
φ˜pi
￿σ−1
, then
GDPi =M
p
i E
1
i P
σ−1
i
￿
ρ
wi
￿σ−1 ￿
φ˜pi
￿σ−1
and as riii(φ˜
p
i ) = E
1
i P
σ−1
i
￿
ρφ˜pi
wi
￿σ−1
then
GDPi =M
p
i riii(φ˜
p
i )
Appendix A.3: Algorithm to calculate the cut-offs
In order to calculate the productivity cut-offs for each activity, you need to guess N domestic
cut-offs (φ∗iii) and with these you can compute for each country i, the N exporting cut-offs (φ∗kii),
the N MP cut-offs (φ∗kki), and the NxN BMP cut-offs (φ
∗
jki) using equation 1.7, 1.10, and 1.13.
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Once we have all the cut-offs computed we need to follow the next steps for each country. Take
country i:
1. Check that the MP cut-offs (φ∗kki) are well computed.
(a) If all the BMP cut-offs for firms from country i producing in country k are bigger
than the MP cut-offs for the same firms (φ∗kki < φ
∗
jki ∀ j), then the MP cut-offs are
well computed and you have to go to step 2.
(b) If at least one BMP cut-off is smaller than the MP cut-off, then:
i. Take the smallest BMP cut-off for firms from country i producing in country k
and re-calculated the MP cut-off using equation 1.14.
ii. If the new MP cut-off is smaller than the second lowest BMP cut-off, then this is
the MP cut-off, otherwise, take the two smallest BMP cut-offs and re-calculated
the MP cut-off using equation 1.14.
iii. Check that the new MP-cut-off is smaller than the rest BMP cut-offs or repeat
the previous step incorporating the next BMP cut-off until the there are no more
BMP cut-offs smaller than the MP cut-off.
iv. Go to step 2
2. Check that the domestic cut-offs are well computed. Order all the exporting cut-offs and
MP cut-offs for country i, from the smallest to the biggest. To simplify the explanation,
assume that the smallest cut-off is the exporting cut-off to country k (φ∗kki) (it can be that
an MP cut-off is the smallest, and the procedure will be the same).
(a) If the exporting cut-off from country i to country k is above the domestic cut-off
(φ∗iii), then the domestic cut-off is well computed and we are done.
(b) If the exporting cut-off to country k is below the domestic cut-off, then:
i. Take the exporting cut-off from country i to country k and the domestic cut-off
from country i and compute the new domestic cut-off using equation firms from
country i producing in country k and re-calculated the MP cut-off using equation
1.12.
ii. If the new domestic cut-off is smaller than the second smallest cut-off (from the
exporting cut-off and MP cut-off set), then this is the domestic cut-off, other-
wise, take the two smallest cut-offs and re-calculated the domestic cut-off using
equation 1.12.
iii. Check that the new domestic cut-off is smaller than the rest of cut-offs (exporting
or MP) or repeat the previous step incorporating the next cut-off until there are
no more cut-offs (exporting or MP) smaller than the domestic cut-off.
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Appendix B.1: Data
Pesquisa Mensal de Emprego From this survey we have data for the years 2003 until 2010.
The PME is a monthly household survey covering the metropolitan areas of six Brazilian regions:
Rio de Janeiro, Sa˜o Paulo, Porto Alegre, Belo Horizonte, Recife and Salvador. Each individual
is followed for three months, left out of the sample the next eight months and interviewed again
the following 4 months. We take the first and fifth interview of each individual for the years
2003 until 2010. In this way we keep two observation of each individual, which corresponds to
the same month of consecutive years. We keep only household where the head is male and he is
older than twenty and younger than sixty years old. The earnings of the household are the sum
of the earnings of all members. In order to make the earnings comparable we deflect them with
the corresponding month Consumer Price Index (CPI) and we divide them by the number of
adults equivalents in the house. In addition, we only keep individuals who are employed in both
periods of the survey. In the final data set we have 131,056 households with data for earnings.
Individual households age is defined as the age of the household head. We use 5 years bin,
centered at the age of interested, in order to compute statistics by age. To do the transition
matrix of employment we consider the individual data. The variable of earnings that we consider
is a constructed variable, which includes the earnings effectively perceived by the individual in
the month from all the works done.
Pesquisa de Ornamentos Familiares The POF is a Consumption-Income survey done every
five or six years. We use data from the last wave, 2008-2009. We consider households where
the main earner is a male, older than twenty and younger than sixty years old. We end up with
44,930 observations. Our income variable includes: income from work, Transfers, Income from
rents, other and Asset Variation. Our measure of consumption includes: food, housing, clothing,
transport, health and personal care, education, recreation and culture, smoking, personal services
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and other current expenses. We normalize household income and consumption by dividing them
by the number of adults equivalents in the house.
Appendix B.2: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Capital rental k by an entrepreneur with wealth a and skills (zm, zw)
is enforceable if and only if
max
m,n,nd,te
{mγkνnθ − wnd − r(k − a) + a− δk − cf Ind>0} ≥
max
m,n,nd,tm
{mγkνnθ − wnd + (1− δ)k − cf Ind>0}
which is equivalent to
(1 + r)a ≥ φ
￿
1− φ+ r + δ + δφ
φ
k − φ max
m,n,nd,te
{mγkνnθ − wnd − cf Ind>0}
￿
Following arguments in Buera, Kaboski, and Shin (2011), the set of enforceable levels of capital
rentals is characterized by a simple set of rental limits. Two cases are relevant. If the max in the
RHS is attained with nd = 0, the set of enforceable levels of capital is [0, k(a, zm, zw;φ)] where
k(a, zm, zw;φ), where k(a, zm, zw;φ) is given by unique root of the equation
(1 + r)a = φ
￿
1− φ+ r + δ + δφ
φ
k − φ max
m,n,nd,te
{mγkνnθ − wnd − cf Ind>0}
￿
If the max in the RHS is attained with nd > 0, then there are two positive roots of the above
equation and the set of enforceable levels of capital rental is [k(a, zm, zw;φ), k(a, zm, zw;φ)],
where k(a, zm, zw;φ) represents the smallest root. Nonetheless, the optimal production plan of
the entrepreneur coincides with the solution to the individual problem subject to the simpler
limit k ≤ k(a, zm, zw;φ). It can also be shown that k(a, zm, zw;φ) is strictly increasing in a, zm,φ
and weakly (strictly) increasing in zw (if nd = 0).
Proof of Proposition 2. The optimal production plan of self-employed individuals solve
πse = (zmtm)
γkν(zw(1− tm))θ − (r + δ)k + (1 + r)a+ µk(k − k)
where γ + ν + θ = 1. The FOC imply:
{tm} zγmkνzθw[γtγ−1m (1− tm)θ − tγmθ(1− tm)θ−1] = 0⇒ t∗m =
γ
γ + θ
{k} (zmtm)γνkν−1(zw(1− tm))θ − r − δ − µk = 0⇒ k =
￿
(zmtm)γν(zw(1− tm))θ
r + δ + µk
￿ 1
1−ν
.
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Note that the first FOC equates the marginal product of entrepreneurial time at managing
and worker. Combining the FOC we obtain that the marginal product of entrepreneurial time
satisfies:
MPTse = γz
γ
m (t
∗
m)
γ−1 k∗ν (zw(1− t∗m))θ
= rmw
￿
zγmz
θ
w
￿ 1
γ+θ
,
where rmw = γ ν
ν
1−ν
￿
γ θ
(γ + θ)2
￿ θ
1−ν
￿
1
r + δ + µ
￿ ν
1−ν
.
Income of self-employed individuals can then be written as
yse = MPtm tm +MPtw tw +MPK k + ra− k(r + δ),
yse = MPTse × 1 + (r + µ+ δ)k + ra− k(r + δ),
yse = rmw
￿
zγmz
θ
w
￿ 1
γ+θ
+ µk + ra.
Proof of Proposition 3. An individual with ability (zm, zw) prefers to be self-employed rather
than work for a wage if and only if
zww + ra <
￿
zγmz
θ
w
￿ 1
θ+γ
rmw + µk + ra,
which holds when the skill ratio satisfies
zw
zm
<
rmw + µk/ ￿zγmzθw￿ 1θ+γ
w
 θ+γγ .
If capital markets are perfect (φ = 1), the Lagrange multiplier on the borrowing constraint is
equal to zero (µ = 0) and the individual prefers to be self-employed rather than work for a wage
if and only if
zw
zm
<
￿rmw
w
￿ θ+γ
γ ≡ R1.
Proof of Proposition 4. The optimal production plan of employers solves
π(zm, zw, a) = Maxtm,tw,nd,k(zmtm)
γkν(nd + zwtw)
θ − wnd − (r + δ)k + (1 + r)a
k ≤ k
tm + tw = 1,
tw ≥ 0.
The non-negativity constraint on tw ensures that managerial time cannot be bigger than 1.
Associate the multiplier µk to the borrowing constraint, µt to the time constraint, and µtw to
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the non-negative constraint on the working time. The FOC of the problem imply
MPK = (zmtm)
γνkν−1(nd + zwtw)θ = r + δ + µk,
MPnd = (zmtm)
γkνθ(nd + zwtw)
θ−1 = w,
MPtm = zmγ(zmtm)
γ−1kν(nd + zwtw)θ = µt,
MPtw = (zmtm)
γθkν(nd + zwtw))
θ−1zw = µt − µtw,
where we have assumed that parameters are such that it is optimal to hire outside labor (nd > 0).
Combining the FOC we obtain:
wzw =MPtw ≤MPtm,with equality only if tw > 0.
We divide the analysis in two steps.
Step 1 : We first show that if the borrowing constraint does not bind (µk = 0), then the en-
trepreneur allocate all his time to managerial tasks (tw = 0, tm = 1). Assume that µk = 0 and
let L ≡ nd+zw(1−tm). Furthermore, to find a contradiction assume that tw > 0. Then, µtw = 0
implies MPtm =MPtw so that
zmγL = tmzmθzw → tm = γL
θzw
. (B.1)
Combining the FOC for MPK and MPnd, gives
(zmtm)
γ
￿
w ν L
(r + δ) θ
￿ν
θLθ−1 = w. (B.2)
Combining (B.1)-(B.2) gives
Lγ+θ+ν−1
￿
zmγ
θzm
￿γ ￿ wν
θ(r + δ)
￿ν
θ = w, (B.3)
which is false in general given that γ+θ+ν−1 = 0.We conclude that if the borrowing constraint
does not bind, then an employer optimally choose to devote all his time to managerial tasks.
Step 2 : Assume that the borrowing constraint binds (k = k). We now show that there exists
a threshold level of assets a∗(zm, zw) such that the optimal production plan features tw > 0 if
a < a∗(zm, zw) and tw = 0 if a > a∗(zm, zw). Thus, if the borrowing constraint is not too tight,
employers allocate all their time to managerial activities. We now find conditions for which
tm < 1(or, equivalently, tw > 0). Note that tm < 1 only if µtw = 0. In this case, the marginal
product of entrepreneurial time is equated across the two uses of time. From the FOC it can be
obtained that
MPtw =MPtm⇒ L = θzwtm
γ
.
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Plugging L into the FOC with respect to labor demand and solving for tm gives an expression
for the optimal fraction of time dedicated to managerial tasks:
tm =
￿
θzγmk
ν
w
￿
γ
zwθ
￿1−θ￿ 11−γ−θ
.
Note that tm < 1 iff
k(a, zm, zw) < k
∗(zm, zw) ≡
￿
w
θzγm
￿
zwθ
γ
￿1−θ￿ 1ν
.
Since k(a, zm, zw) is increasing in a, the inverse of this function can be used to define a thresh-
old level of assets a∗(zm, zw) such that tm < 1 if and only if assets are below this threshold.
Otherwise, tm = 1.
Step 3 : Compute the marginal product of employers time. From Step 1 and 2, when assets are
below a∗(zm, zw) we have MPtm = MPtw = wzw. On the other hand, when assets are above
a∗(zm, zw) , tm = 1 and MPtm > MPtw. To obtain an expression for MPtm note that the
FOC with respect to capital and outside labor imply:
k =
wν
(r + δ + µk)θ
nd
nd =
￿
θzγm
w
￿
wν
(r + δ + µk)θ
￿ν￿ 11−(ν+θ)
Plugging k and nd into MPtm = γz
γ
mkνnθd gives
MPtm = zmγ
￿￿
ν
(r + δ + µ)
￿ν ￿ θ
w
￿θ￿ 11−(ν+θ)
Proof of Proposition 5. An individual with ability (zm, zw) and assets a prefers being an
employer rather than self-employment if and only if
￿
zγmz
θ
w
￿ 1
θ+γ
rmw + µsekse + ra < zmrm + µeke + ra,
where µe and µse are the Lagrange multipliers associated to the borrowing constraints when the
individual is an employer or is self-employed, respectively, and ke and kse are the capital used
in production at these occupations. This inequality holds when the ability ratio is such that
￿
rm
rmw
+
(µeke − cf )
zmrmw
− (µsekse)
zmrmw
￿ θ+γ
θ ≡ R2,
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If capital markets are perfect (φ = 1), the Lagrange multiplier on the borrowing constraint is
equal to zero (µ = 0) and the individual prefers to be an employer rather than be self-employed
if and only if
zw
zm
< R2
￿
1− cf
zmrmw
￿ θ+γ
θ
, where R2 ≡
￿
rm
rmw
￿ θ+γ
θ
.
Proof of Proposition 6. When φ = 1 the Lagrange multiplier on the borrowing constraint
is equal to zero (µ = 0) and occupational choice decisions are independent of asset holdings
and maximize the marginal product of time. Proposition 4 established that an individual with
ability (zm, zw) prefers to be self-employed rather than work for a wage if and only if the skill
ratio satisfies
zw
zm
< R1 ≡
￿rmw
w
￿ θ+γ
γ
.
Assuming that the fixed cost of operation cf = 0, then Proposition 5 implies that an individual
with ability (zm, zw) prefers to be entrepreneur instead of self-employed if and only if the skill
ratio satisfies
zw
zm
< R2 ≡
￿
rm
rmw
￿ θ+γ
θ
.
If parameters are such that R2 < R1, then self-employment is dominated by either being an
employer or a worker. The optimal occupational choice is to be an employer if and only if
zm
zw
> wrm . Otherwise, the optimal occupational choice is to work for a wage. When employers
incur a fixed cost of operation, being an employer is preferred to being self-employed if and only
if ￿
zγmz
θ
w
￿ 1
1−ν
rmw < (zmrm − cf ) ,
which holds when zwzm <
￿
rm
rmw
− cfrmwzm
￿ θ+γ
θ
.
Bibliography
Acemoglu, D., and J. Robinson (2012): Why Nations Fail: Origins of Power, Poverty and
Prosperity. Crown Publishers (Random House).
Amaral, P. S., and E. Quintin (2010): “Limited Enforcement, Financial Itermediation, and
Economic Development: A Quantitative Assesment,” International Economic Review, 51(3),
785–811.
Arkolakis, C., and M.-A. Muendler (2010): “The extensive margin of exporting products:
A firm-level analysis,” Discussion paper, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Arkolakis, C., N. Ramondo, A. Rodriguez-Clare, and S. Yeaple (2013): “Innovation
and Production in the Global Economy,” NBER Working Paper Series, w18972.
Banerjee, A. V., and A. F. Newman (1993): “Occupational choice and the process of
development,” Journal of political economy, 101(2), 274–298.
Barba Navaretti, G., and A. Venables (2004): Multinational firms in the world economy.
Princeton University Press Princeton.
Breinlich, H., and A. Cun˜at (2010): “Trade Liberalization and Heterogeneous Firm Models:
An Evaluation Using the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement,” .
Buera, F. J., J. P. Kaboski, and Y. Shin (2011): “Finance and Development: A Tale of
Two Sectors,” American Economic Review, 101(5), 1964–2002.
Buera, F. J., and Y. Shin (2011): “Self-insurance vs. self-financing: A welfare analysis of the
persistence of shocks,” Journal of Economic Theory, 146(3), 845–862.
Bustos, P. (2011): “Trade Liberalization, Exports, and Technology Upgrading: Evidence on
the Impact of MERCOSUR on Argentinian Firms,” American Economic Review, 101(1), 304–
40.
Chaney, T. (2008): “Distorted gravity: the intensive and extensive margins of international
trade,” The American Economic Review, 98(4), 1707–1721.
100
Bibliography 101
Eaton, J., and S. Kortum (2002): “Technology, Geography, and Trade,” Econometrica, 70(5),
1741–1779.
Erosa, A. (2001): “Financial intermediation and occupational choice in development,” Review
of Economic Dynamics, 4(2), 303–334.
Galor, O., and J. Zeira (1993): “Income distribution and macroeconomics,” The Review of
Economic Studies, 60(1), 35–52.
Garc´ıa-Santana, M., and J. Pijoan-Mas (2012): “Small Scale Reservation Laws and the
Misallocation of Talent,” .
Ghironi, F., and M. J. Melitz (2005): “International Trade and Macroeconomic Dynamics
with Heterogeneous Firms,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 120(3), 865–915.
Greenwood, J., J. M. Sanchez, and C. Wang (2010): “Financing Development: The Role
of Information Costs,” American Economic Review, 100(4), 1875–91.
Guner, N., G. Ventura, and Y. Xu (2008): “Macroeconomic implications of size-dependent
policies,” Review of Economic Dynamics, 11(4), 721–744.
Helpman, E. (1984): “A Simple Theory of International Trade with Multinational Corpora-
tions,” Journal of Political Economy, 92(3), pp. 451–471.
Helpman, E., M. J. Melitz, and S. R. Yeaple (2004): “Export versus FDI with Heteroge-
neous Firms,” The American Economic Review, 94(1), pp. 300–316.
Horstmann, I. J., and J. R. Markusen (1992): “Endogenous market structures in interna-
tional trade (natura facit saltum),” Journal of International Economics, 32(1-2), 109–129.
Irarrazabal, A., A. Moxnes, and L. D. Opromolla (2013): “The Margins of Multinational
Production and the Role of Intrafirm Trade,” Journal of Political Economy, 121(1), 74 – 126.
Jeong, H., and R. M. Townsend (2007): “Sources of TFP growth: occupational choice and
financial deepening,” Economic Theory, 32(1), 179–221.
Ju´nior, R., M. Bugarin, V. Gomes, and A. Teixeira (2004): “Investment and Capital
Accumulation in Brazil from 1970 to 2000: A Neoclassical View,” Working papers-Textos
para Discussao do Departamento de Economia da Universidade de Brasilia.
Lucas, R. E. (1978): “On the size distribution of business firms,” The Bell Journal of Eco-
nomics, pp. 508–523.
Markusen, J. R. (1995): “The boundaries of multinational enterprises and the theory of
international trade,” The Journal of Economic Perspectives, pp. 169–189.
Bibliography 102
Markusen, J. R., and A. J. Venables (2000): “The theory of endowment, intra-industry
and multi-national trade,” Journal of International Economics, 52(2), 209–234.
Melitz, M. J. (2003): “The impact of trade on intra-industry reallocations and aggregate
industry productivity,” Econometrica, 71(6), 1695–1725.
Midrigan, V., and D. Y. Xu (2014): “Finance and Misallocation: Evidence from Plant-Level
Data,” American Economic Review, 104(2), 422–58.
Ohnsorge, F., and D. Trefler (2007): “Sorting It Out: International Trade with Heteroge-
neous Workers,” Journal of Political Economy, 115(5), 868–892.
Piguillem, F., and L. Rubini (2012): “International Trade and the Firm Size Distribution,”
2012 Meeting Papers 857, Society for Economic Dynamics.
Ramondo, N., and V. Rappoport (2010): “The role of multinational production in a risky
environment,” Journal of International Economics, 81(2), 240–252.
Ramondo, N., and A. Rodr´ıguez-Clare (2013): “Trade, Multinational Production, and the
Gains from Openness,” Journal of Political Economy, 121(2), 273 – 322.
Restuccia, D., and R. Rogerson (2008): “Policy distortions and aggregate productivity
with heterogeneous establishments,” Review of Economic Dynamics, 11(4), 707–720.
Storesletten, K., C. Telmer, and A. Yaron (2005): “Consumption and risk sharing over
the life cycle,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 52(7), 1331–1358.
Tintelnot, F. (2012): “Global production with export platforms,” Unpublished document,
Pennsylvania State Univ., University Park.
Waugh, M. E. (2010): “International Trade and Income Differences,” American Economic
Review, 100(5), 2093–2124.
